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A new innovation on the IPO landscape has emerged in the last two
decades, allowing owner-founders to extract billions of dollars from newly
public companies. These IPOs-labeled supercharged IPOs-have been the
subject of widespread debate and controversy: lawyers, financial experts,
journalists, and members of Congress have all weighed in on the topic. Some
have argued that supercharged IPOs are "brilliant, just brilliant," while
others have labeled them "underhanded" and "bizarre."
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In this Article, we explore the supercharged IPO and explain how and
why this new deal structure differs from the more traditional IPO. We then
outline various theories of financial innovation and note that the extant
literature provides useful explanations for why supercharged IPOs emerged
and spread so quickly across industries and geographic areas. Theory
provides support for both legitimate and opportunistic uses of the
supercharged IPO.
With the help of a large-N quantitative study-the first of its kind-we
investigate the adoption and diffusion of this new innovation. We find that the
reason parties have begun to supercharge their IPOs is not linked to a desire
to steal from naive investors but rather for tax-planning purposes.
Supercharged IPOs enable both owner-founders and public investors to save
substantial amounts of money in federal and state taxes. We conclude our
study by demonstrating how our empirical findings can be used to (1) advance
the literature on innovation, (2) assist firms going public in the future, and (3)
shape legal reform.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Suppose you make an offer to purchase a new home. While
reviewing the offer, the seller sees that you plan to get a home
mortgage, which in turn means that you may qualify for the home
mortgage interest tax deduction.' This deduction is potentially quite
valuable and could save you tens of thousands of dollars in taxes over
1. See DEAN STANSEL & ANTHONY RANDAZZO, REASON FOUND., UNMASKING THE
MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION: WHO BENEFITS AND BY How MUCH 5 (2011), available at
http://perma.cc/T5C7-9WLF (noting Congress's Joint Committee on Taxation's estimate that 20-
25% of tax returns claim a home mortgage interest deduction).
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the period in which you make interest payments.2 Recognizing this
value, the seller counteroffers, proposing a deal whereby you give her
85% of your tax savings. If your mortgage interest deduction saves you
$1,000 in taxes each year, this deal would require that you make
annual transfers of $850 to the seller as you obtain that tax break. Put
differently, the proposed deal would require you to make an up-front
payment for the purchase of the property in the year of the sale, along
with an additional $850 every year thereafter while you maintain your
mortgage and take advantage of the mortgage interest tax deduction.
Why would you ever agree to share your tax benefits with the seller?3
As it turns out, tax-sharing agreements, often labeled "tax
receivable agreements" ("TRAs"), are common in many corners of the
legal and financial landscape.4 TRAs, for example, routinely emerge
between partners in small businesses,5 employers and employees,6 and
corporations and their shareholders.7 These sharing agreements come
2. See id. at 9 (estimating the average annual tax savings from mortgage interest
deduction is between $96 and $2221).
3. After all, it is commonly believed that the tax benefit of the home mortgage interest
deduction is capitalized into the price of residential property. See, e.g., Richard Voith, Does the
Federal Tax Treatment of Housing Affect the Pattern of Metropolitan Development?, Bus. REV.,
Mar.-Apr. 1999, at 3, 7 (noting a range of estimates of the extent to which the benefits are
capitalized). In the IPO context, the focus of this paper, it is less clear whether the tax benefits
associated with the deal are fully capitalized into price. See infra notes 64-65 and accompanying
text.
4. That the sharing of tax benefits and liabilities occurs both implicitly and explicitly is
widely understood and extensively studied. See, e.g., Anne Beatty, The Cash Flow and
Informational Effects of Employee Stock Ownership Plans, 38 J. FIN. ECON. 211, 211-40 (1994)
(empirically examining the relationship between tax savings and firm value); Dan S. Dhaliwal et
al., The Effect of Seller Income Taxes on Acquisition Price: Evidence from Purchases of Taxable
and Tax-Exempt Hospitals, J. AM. TAX. ASS'N, Fall 2004, at 1, 1-21 (stating that large tax
liabilities generated by sale increase the price of assets); Merle M. Erickson & Edward L.
Maydew, Implicit Taxes in High Dividend Yield Stocks, 73 AcCT. REV. 435, 435-58 (1998)
(asserting presence of implicit tax sharing when tax-favored preferred stock produces lower
returns); Douglas A. Shackelford & Terry Shevlin, Empirical Tax Research in Accounting, 31 J.
ACCT. & ECON. 321, 321-87 (2001) (discussing extensive study of tax-sharing agreements in
accounting literature); Douglas A. Shackelford, The Market for Tax Benefits: Evidence from
Leveraged ESOPs, 14 J. ACCT. & EcON. 117, 117-45 (1991) (arguing competitive markets are
more likely to cause companies to share tax benefits with investors).
5. See J. WILLIAM CALLISON & MAUREEN A. SULLIVAN, PARTNERSHIP LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 4.15 (2012) (describing how tax benefits and tax liabilities pass through the partnership and
are shared by the partners).
6. See Shackelford & Shevlin, supra note 4, at 330-31 (discussing the extent to which
companies trade off higher salaries for tax deductions via stock options).
7. See Lynda Livingston et al., Investigating the DARPS Market Meltdown Through an
Investments Project, 2 Bus. EDUC. & ACCREDITATION 77, 77-78 (2010) (describing arrangement in
which nontaxable companies issue stock with the explicit purpose of enabling fully taxable
corporate investors to share benefits of tax breaks). See generally Merle M. Erickson & Shiing-wu
Wang, Exploiting and Sharing Tax Benefits: Seagram and DuPont, J. AM. TAX. ASS'N, Fall 1999,
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THE SUPERCHARGED IPO
in many different forms, but they all involve the same underlying
feature: the parties apportion tax benefits (and sometimes tax
liabilities) according to a pre-agreed-upon formula.
In this Article, we focus on TRAs that have made their way
into an entirely new arena: initial public offerings. Owners of private
companies who sell their business assets in a public offering now
sometimes demand that the new public company share the value of
various underlying tax benefits, such as tax deductions and tax
credits, well after the deal has been completed. These types of IPOs-
deals supercharged with post-sale payments-were unseen and
unheard of prior to 1993.8 Today, they involve the transfer of billions
of dollars back to the original owners on an annual basis,9 and they
have become more than a little controversial.10
Commentators and analysts have argued these payments are
"a little bit underhanded,"" "unusually one-sided,"12 "pure gravy,"13
and a "bizarre siphoning off of cash."14 Skeptics argue that insiders are
taking advantage of the great uncertainty associated with IPO pricing,
which may not reflect the post-sale TRA payments made to the
original owner-founder. At the same time, advocates argue that
financial innovators have devised a useful means to compensate
founders for the company they created and the costs of going public.
at 35, 35 (analyzing a widely admired tax plan in which tax benefits were shared between
corporation and corporate shareholder in a stock purchase agreement between Seagram and
DuPont).
8. The first notable supercharged IPO emerged in 1993, but supercharged IPOs did not
become more prevalent until the mid-2000s. See Amy S. Elliot, IPO Agreements that Shift the
Basis of Step-Up to Sellers Proliferate, TAX NOTES, July 25, 2011, at 334, 338, available at
http://perma.cc/J283-KHW2 (providing a brief history of TRAs in an IPO context).
9. Blackstone Partners May Avoid Tax on IPO Gains, http://perma.cc/462W-V5NJ
(reuters.com, archived Feb. 3, 2014) (describing a 2007 deal that enabled sellers to recoup
roughly $900 million in post-sale payments stemming from investors' tax benefits).
10. TRAs invite suspicion for a couple of reasons. First, the founders appear to take
advantage of a tax arbitrage: payments received under the TRA are treated as capital gains-as
a portion of the sales proceeds from the IPO-while the public holding company takes deductions
at the higher ordinary-income rate. See infra notes 58-60 and accompanying text. Second, when
the dust settles, the selling founders are effectively reimbursed for any taxes they have paid to
the government. As tax lawyer Lee Sheppard noted, "These guys have figured out how to turn
paying taxes into an annuity." David Cay Johnston, Blackstone Devises Way to Avoid Taxes on
$3.7 Billion, http://perma.cc/CNR7-ZJ3Y (nytimes.com, archived Feb. 3, 2014) (critiquing TRAs
as fundamentally unfair because they provide tax benefits that are inconsistent with those
available to other high earners).
11. Elliot, supra note 8, at 334 (quoting Robert Willens).
12. Blackstone Partners May Avoid Tax on IPO Gains, supra note 9 (quoting Lee Sheppard).
13. Elliot, supra note 8, at 337 (quoting Robert Willens).
14. Carlyle's "Cash Tax Savings" Won't Go to Unit Holders, http://perma.cc/Z9MU-GQPC
(peureport.blogspot.com, archived Feb. 3, 2014).
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There is "nothing nefarious about it,"15 notes Robert Willens, a leading
tax expert and the one who coined the term "supercharged IPO."16 The
agreements, he notes, are "all disclosed" to the public well before the
IPO takes place.17 Notwithstanding the vocal skepticism over the
deals' rationale and underlying fairness, many experts describe
supercharged IPOs as "masterpiece[s],"" works of "artistry,"19 and
"[b]rilliant, just brilliant."20
Supercharged IPOs have generated substantial notice, debate,
and controversy, but no commentator has posed the question, "Why
now?" After all, owners and founders have taken companies public for
well over four hundred years,21 yet these unusual payout schemes
emerged just two decades ago. Moreover, this innovative IPO has
spread across industries and geographic areas, a process that raises
the question of how and why financial innovations diffuse. Finally,
and perhaps most importantly, the supercharged IPO raises the
question of who actually benefits: the owner-founders, the public
investors, or both? In this study, we seek to answer these questions
with the help of a large database of IPO transactions-the first of its
kind-which includes both conventional and supercharged deals over
the course of the last several decades.
Our study begins in Parts II.A and B by comparing and
contrasting traditional IPOs with the new supercharged IPO.22 We
note that supercharged IPOs come in different forms and have gone
through a series of complex iterations over the course of time, but they
all contain one key component: a TRA that requires the new public
company to transfer large sums of cash to the owner-founders in the
post-IPO period. After describing supercharged IPOs as an important
15. Elliot, supra note 8, at 339.
16. Robert Willens, General Electric 'Supercharges' the Genworth Financial IPO, TAX
NOTES, Aug. 9, 2004, at 661, available at http://perma.cc/P9YF-TYC4.
17. Elliot, supra note 8, at 339; see also Jeffrey J. Rosen & Peter A. Furci, Monetizing the
Shield: Tax Receivable Agreements in Private Equity Deals, DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON PRIVATE
EQUITY REP., Fall 2010, at 9-10, 23, available at http://perma.cc/G625-234C (arguing that,
despite risks and drawbacks of TRAs, they have a "certain symmetry because existing owners
receive tax benefits associated with a tax liability they have borne").
18. Allan Sloan, GE Perfects the Fine Art of Tax Savings, http://perma.cc/3BCV-NDYH
(washingtonpost.com, archived Feb. 3, 2014).
19. Id.
20. Id. (quoting Robert Willens).
21. See Bill Baue & Marcy Murninghan, The Accountability Web: Weaving Corporate
Accountability and Interactive Technology 18 (Corporate Soc. Responsibility Initiative, Working
Paper No. 58, 2010), available at http://perma.cclUJ34-JGQN (asserting that the Dutch East
India Trading Company conducted the world's first IPO in 1602).
22. See infra notes 34-69 and accompanying text.
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financial innovation, Part II.C then outlines the means by which
companies disclose the details of the payout schemes to their
investors, highlighting the various risks that each party undertakes.23
In Part III, we turn to the theoretical literature to understand
how and why financial innovations, such as supercharged IPOs, enter
the market. 24 We focus first on the drivers of the financial innovation.
We observe that the incentive to generate new strategies is not a
discoverer's passion and zeal, but a desire to solve specific problems
that arise in the transactional context, like risk aversion, information
asymmetry, and regulatory costs.2 5 We then explore the underlying
theories for how and why innovations diffuse across markets and
industries; we find that many theorists associate this process with
factors such as elite financial intermediaries, professional networks,
firm culture, and media coverage.26 Part III presents a series of
interconnected theories and hypotheses that explain the rise and the
spread of the supercharged IPO, thereby framing our empirical
investigation in Part IV. 27
Few scholars have attempted an empirical exploration of
financial innovations,28 and no scholar or team of scholars has sought
23. See infra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
24. Quite a few scholars have investigated financial innovation from both a theoretical and
qualitative perspective. Many historical and sociological studies, for example, have cataloged
significant inventions throughout history, and economists have proffered a variety of theories for
why inventions emerge and proliferate. See Darrell Duffie & Rohit Rahi, Financial Market
Innovation and Security Design: An Introduction, 65 J. ECON. THEORY 1, 5-7 (1993) (listing
economic events and innovations that followed between 1971 and 1986); see also Symposium,
Financial Market innovation and Security Design, 65 J. EcON. THEORY 1, 43-298 (1993)
(investigating innovation from various perspectives).
25. See EVERETT M. ROGERS, DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS 10-12, 132-34 (1995) (discussing
the need to spur innovation and establishing a framework to describe how innovations spread);
David M. Schizer, Frictions as a Constraint on Tax Planning, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1312, 1316-17
(2001) (noting that innovations emerge to address problems with market frictions); see also
MYRON S. SCHOLES ET AL., TAXES & BUSINESS STRATEGY (4th ed. 2008) (integrating traditional
MBA topics to explain how taxes affect decisionmaking).
26. See infra notes 113-24 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 75-125 and accompanying text.
28. See Mahbrouk Abir & Mamoghli Chokri, Dynamic Financial Innovation and
Performance of Banking Firms: Context of an Emerging Banking Industry, 51 INT'L RES. J. FIN. &
ECON. 17, 18 (2010) ("[I]n spite of extensive descriptive literature on financial innovation, there
is a paucity of empirical studies."); Jalal Akhavein et al., The Diffusion of Financial Innovations:
An Examination of the Adoption of Small Business Credit Scoring by Large Banking
Organizations, 78 J. BUS. 577, 578 (2005) (acknowledging seven quantitative studies
investigating the process by which innovation diffuses); Josh Lerner, The New New Financial
Thing: The Origins of Financial Innovations, 79 J. FIN. ECON. 223, 224 (2006) (stating that,
despite the importance of financial innovation, only thirty-nine empirical studies exist on the
topic). This gap in the literature is not surprising: it is often difficult to identify the specific time
and place of most innovations, and diffusion patterns depend on data that is obscure and
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to explain the emergence of supercharged IPOs. In this study, we seek
to fill these surprising gaps. Part IV.A outlines our data-collection
process and explains our statistical models.29 Part IV.B presents our
findings vis-A-vis the supercharged IPO's rise and proliferation. We
find the initial motivation for pursuing this new deal structure relates
to tax planning, not opportunism, as some critics have alleged. More
specifically, our data indicate that supercharged IPOs are highly
correlated with the existence of a tax-arbitrage opportunity-namely,
the ability to sell the company's assets (and pay tax at a low capital
gains rate) while the new public company amortizes that same asset
at higher ordinary-income rates.30 By contrast, we find little evidence
of devious planning by owner-founders to profit from naive investors.
If the desire to sneak money away from shareholders was the
motivating force, we would expect to find more supercharged IPOs in
the absence of tax arbitrage, and we would expect them to be more
frequent in deals where information costs are high and shareholders
more vulnerable.31 With respect to how new ideas diffuse in the
financial sector, we find that the process is best explained by two
factors: elite lawyers and professional networks-especially those
located in New York City.32
Finally, in Part V, we note that our findings have important
implications for transactional lawyers, legislators, and scholars who
study financial innovation.33 Our qualitative analyses indicate that
supercharged IPOs enable the parties in the deal to save substantial
amounts of money in taxes when they are subject to different tax
rates, making tax arbitrage a possibility. We highlight the specific
means by which transactional lawyers and deal planners can achieve
these results, given the findings of our study. This tax-avoidance
opportunity, however, raises the normative question of whether the
revenue losses from these innovative deals reduce overall social
welfare. Congress has proposed legislation to eliminate tax benefits of
supercharged IPOs, but our analysis indicates the extant proposals
are underinclusive and may not achieve the stated goals. We propose
frequently unavailable outside private firms. Fortunately, these hurdles do not exist for our
study, in large part because federal securities laws require public companies to disclose details of
the post-IPO payouts, and for this reason, we are able to track both the emergence and the
diffusion of the supercharged IPO.
29. See infra notes 126-35 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 136-59 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 136-59 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 157-59 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 160-90 and accompanying text.
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alternative routes that would enable legal reformers to close the
perceived loophole both in the IPO context and more broadly. Finally,
our study advances the existing literature on financial innovation. The
literature is largely theoretical and often presents a series of
competing explanations for any given innovation. Our approach builds
on this scholarship and demonstrates how scholars can use empirical
data to test the competing theories, and it shows that it is possible to
extricate the value of each theory for explaining financial innovation.
II. INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS
IPOs are transactions where privately held companies register
and sell stock to the public for the first time. A successful IPO infuses
the company with substantial cash, thereby making it possible to
expand and diversify the business, increase research and
development, retire debt obligations, and so forth.34 By creating a
public market in a company's shares, IPOs also often provide liquidity
and exit options for the founders, investors, and employees who own
shares in the company. Indeed, for many insiders, the true benefit of
going public is monetizing the pre-IPO owners' interest in the
company: founders often realize a sizable return by selling shares
directly to the public or in a secondary offering a few months after the
IPO. 35
Pricing a company for sale to the public, however, is a complex
endeavor that involves consideration of many factors, including the
underlying company assets; trends in sales and earnings; adequacy of
present and projected capital and cash flow; and the experience,
integrity, and quality of management.36 The first factor-the
company's underlying assets--often includes a category labeled "tax
assets," which are simply the tax deductions, credits, and exemptions
that generate tax savings for the company in the future, just like the
34. Companies that go public file a prospectus that includes a description of the business
along with the growth plans. See, e.g., Fortress Inv. Grp. LLC, Registration Statement
(Form S-1) (Feb. 2, 2007), available at http://perma.cc/6JQG-4PVP. For a useful review of the
IPO process and theories for why companies go public, see CARL W. SCHNEIDER ET AL., GOING
PUBLIC 1-5 (2002); PATRICK J. SCHULTHEIS ET AL., THE INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERING 1-12 (2004);
and Jay Ritter & Ivo Welch, A Review of IPO Activity, Pricing, and Allocations, 57 J. FIN. 1795,
1796-1802 (2002).
35. ANDREW W. NEEDHAM, PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS, at A-90 (Tax Mgmt. Portfolio No. 735,
2d ed. 2010).
36. SCHULTHEIS ET AL., supra note 34, at 186-88.
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home mortgage interest deduction for individuals.37 For example, if a
company purchases goodwill (an item associated with corporate
identity and customer relationships, among other things) for
$15 million and ratably amortizes the cost of that asset over fifteen
years on its tax return, it would take a deduction of $1 million a
year.38 At a 35% tax rate, this deduction could save the company a
total of $5.25 million in taxes over fifteen years.39 That savings
becomes known as a tax asset: because a corporation's ability to
reduce its tax burden is valuable to its bottom line, companies account
for future tax deductions-or deferred tax assets, as they are more,
formally known-on their balance sheets, just as future tax liabilities
are.40 This information, in turn, can play a role in the valuation
process when companies go public in an IPO: as the value of net tax
assets increase, so too should a company's market value.
Tax assets are routinely tracked and valued by companies on
their balance sheets, but there is some debate as to whether and how
well the market prices these assets into the stock at the time of an
IPO. The value of a deferred tax asset, for example, is a function of the
company's future profits and future tax rate, factors that force
managers and accountants to exercise some discretion in valuing the
tax assets.41 Indeed, many argue that the valuation process is more
art than science given the inherent unpredictability of profits and tax
rates.42 Moreover, and perhaps more alarming, there is some reason to
think that IPO stock analysts pay little attention to tax assets,
focusing instead on the valuation of comparable companies that
37. For a useful and detailed discussion of tax assets, see generally Anja De Waegenaere et
al., Valuation of Deferred Tax Assets from a Net Operating Loss Carryover (Tilburg Sch. Econ.
& Mgmt. CentER, Discussion Paper No. 2001-24, 2001); Gregory Miller & Douglas J. Skinner,
Determinants of the Valuation Allowance for Deferred Tax Assets Under SFAS No. 109, 73 ACCT.
REV. 213 (1998).
38. See I.R.C. § 197(a), (d)(1)(A) (2012) (calculating deduction on intangible assets by
amortizing over fifteen-year period).
39. $15,000,000 x .35 = $5,250,000.
40. See generally Miller & Skinner, supra note 37 (examining how to account for deferred
tax assets).
41. See generally Robert Willens, Accounting for Deferred Tax Assets and Liabilities-
Citigroup, WILLENS REP., Jan. 9, 2013 (demonstrating that the realization of future tax benefits
depend on many factors and decisions); Miller & Skinner, supra note 37, at 217-19 (same,
comparing decisionmaking among three companies).
42. Robert Stammers, What Does an IPO Price Mean?, http://perma.cc/AHG9-HYQ7
(forbes.com, archived Feb. 3, 2014) (discussing the asset-based, income, and market approaches
for valuing companies in an IPO); see Miller & Skinner, supra note 37, at 217-19 (comparing the
unpredictability in valuing deferred tax assets).
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already trade on the public markets.43 As we discuss below, the
presence of tax assets and the uncertainty of their role in IPO pricing
are prime motivators for supercharged IPO deals.
A. The Traditional IPO
To understand the supercharged IPO as a financial innovation,
it is useful to consider the traditional IPO. To begin, assume that
Founders Co., a privately held corporation, operates its business
through a subsidiary. Assume also that the assets of the company
include real property that can be depreciated (such as a building)44
and intangible property that cannot be depreciated (such as self-
created goodwill).45 This company, in short, has three assets: the
building, the goodwill, and a tax asset linked to the tax deductions for
future depreciation, all of which will be listed on the company's
balance sheet.
If Founders Co. chooses to go public in a traditional IPO (as
depicted in Figure 1), it will sell newly issued shares of stock to the
public for an agreed-upon price, a structure that reflects a simplified
version of the IPO. The public offering infuses Founders Co. with
substantial cash based on the value of the underlying assets (or
possibly based on comparable firms trading on the market, as just
43. See Sanjeev Bhojraj & Charles M.C. Lee, Who is My Peer? A Valuation-Based Approach
to the Selection of Comparable Firms, 40 J. ACCT. RES. 407, 407-35 (2002) (acknowledging that
the comparable firm approach is widely used and arguing that accurate valuations depend on the
identification of appropriate peer firms); Stammers, supra note 42 (highlighting LinkedIn's day-
one stock climb despite the wide disparity of its balance sheet when judged by non-GAAP versus
GAAP metrics).
44. See I.R.C. §§ 167-68 (2012) (setting rules governing tax deductions for asset
depreciation).
45. Congress defines goodwill as "the value of a trade or business attributable to the
expectancy of continued customer patronage . . . . due to the name or reputation of a trade or
business or any other factor." Treas. Reg. § 1.197-2(b)(1) (as amended in 2013). In the accounting
context, the term is an indication on the balance sheet that the whole is greater than the sum of
its parts. Andrew F. Halaby, Comment, Treatment of Goodwill by the Seller Under LR. C. Section
197, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 903, 905 (1995). Many corporate assets give rise to amortization and
depreciation tax deductions, thereby enabling the company to recover its costs and save
substantial monies in taxes over the course of years. Goodwill, however, is subject to a unique
rule: if the asset is self-generated, it cannot be amortized, but if it is purchased, the tax laws
allow the purchaser to amortize the cost of the asset over a fifteen-year period. See I.R.C. § 197
(providing deduction only for acquired intangible assets). As we will see, acquired goodwill-




noted). From a tax perspective, however, the IPO is a nonevent-
typically, none of the parties will pay any tax on the deal.46




Founders Co. - - Cash
Subsidir
Note: Founders Co. sells stock to the public and obtains substantial cash, but the
transaction does not generate any tax costs for any of the parties.
The traditional IPO generates substantial cash for the
company and avoids tax costs, but many commentators view the
transaction as inefficient and wasteful for at least two reasons. First,
the deal could have been structured to accomplish the parties' goals
while reducing taxes.47 Second, experts believe that IPO investors
routinely undervalue companies, given the arcane nature of the tax
assets that reside inside the company, and thus founders are under-
compensated for their companies.48 A TRA-an agreement to share
tax benefits generated in an IPO transaction-could address these
twin problems, enabling the parties to capture most of the value lost
by the overpayment of taxes and the undervaluation of the stock
price.49
46. See I.R.C. § 1032(a) ("No gain or loss shall be recognized to a corporation on the receipt
of money or other property in exchange for stock (including treasury stock) of such corporation.").
If the founders sell some of their own stock in connection with or after the IPO, they will
typically pay tax at long-term capital gains rates. See id. §§ 1(h), 1221-23. But these sales will
typically have no effect on the tax profile of the company.
47. See infra notes 50-58 and accompanying text.
48. See supra notes 34-43 and accompanying text for an explanation of tax assets; infra
notes 62-69 and accompanying text for a discussion of investor undervaluation of companies
with tax assets.




B. The Supercharged IPO
A supercharged IPO differs from a traditional IPO for one key
reason: it always involves a TRA that calls for the parties to share the
value of the company's underlying tax assets. Recall from above that
tax assets are simply deductions, credits, or exemptions that allow a
company to reduce its tax liability down the road. Since 1993, when
the first supercharged IPO appeared, several different formulations of
the deal have emerged, but each new generation has built on the
basics of the earliest deals. For this reason, we limit our discussion to
two iterations of these new deal structures to illustrate the key
features. As we note below, experts justify each new wave with a
different underlying rationale, ranging from legitimate and efficiency
enhancing to pure thievery on the part of the founders.
The most typical supercharged IPO deal structure enables the
parties to reduce future taxes by creating new tax assets for the
company. To accomplish this feat, the parties add some additional
steps to the deal. First, Founders Co. transfers its subsidiary to a
newly created corporation, Public Co., in exchange for Public Co.'s
stock. Founders Co. and Public Co. then sell a large percentage of
Public Co. stock to a third party (the investing public).50 This
arrangement, depicted in Figure 2 below, is an alternative to that
presented in Figure 1 and has the advantage of not only transferring
Founders Co.'s preexisting tax assets to Public Co, but also generating
new tax assets.
50. Actually, Founders Co. sells the shares to an investment bank, which then sells to the
public. SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 34, at 20-30; SCHULTHEIS ET AL., supra note 34, at 35-45.
From a tax perspective, this arrangement can have important consequences. The deal can be
structured to fail the so-called control test, turning the deal from a tax nonrecognition event into
a mere taxable exchange without tax consequences. I R.C. §§ 351, 338(h)(3)(A)(iii). In the lexicon
of tax lawyers, this means that the deal is a "busted 351 transaction" and, as such, qualifies as a
taxable transaction. The tax treatment is important here because it determines the basis of
Public Co.'s assets. The tax basis in an asset is the amount that generates depreciation
deductions, id. §§ 167-68, and is adjusted as depreciation tax deductions are taken. Id. § 1011.
Thus, if Public Co. inherits a "carry-over basis" in an ordinary 351 transaction, it would obtain
assets with a low basis that has been depreciated down in the hands of Founders Co. Of course,
Public Co. does not want the carry-over basis but prefers a "stepped-up basis" that reflects the
fair market value of the asset (and allows for substantially more deprecation down the road).
Public Co. will thus want the parties to make a section 338(h) election and treat the transaction
as sale. Id. § 338(h). This election enables Public Co. to obtain a stepped-up basis in the
underlying assets, reflecting their current fair market value. For a description of these rules, see
Rev. Rul. 79-70, 1979-1 C.B. 144; Rev. Rul. 79-194, 1979-1 C.B. 145; I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 97-
47-001 (July 1, 1997); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-41-039 (July 20, 1995), as modified by I.R.S. Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 95-49-036 (Sept. 15, 1995); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-42-013 (July 17, 1991).
3192014]1
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
It is easy to understand the role of preexisting tax assets in the
deal: these assets are listed on the company's balance sheet, and like
all the other company assets, they are transferred to Public Co.,
thereby enabling Public Co. to use them to reduce taxes down the
road.51 But how are new tax assets created in the deal? The answer to
this question has to do with an unusual provision found inside the tax
code: after taking the steps just described, Founders Co. and Public
Co. can elect to treat the transaction as a "sale" of assets.52 While our
goal in this study is not to explain the tax-related intricacies of going
public, it is useful to understand that the parties have control over the
size and extent of the tax assets that will reside inside the new Public
Co. If the parties elect to treat the transaction as a sale, they literally
create new tax assets for Public Co.53 Recall from above, for example,
that Founders Co. has goodwill that it could not amortize because it
was self-created, but if Public Co. is viewed as having purchased that
goodwill, then the latter will be permitted to amortize the value of the
asset.54 Public Co.'s new tax assets-the amortization tax deductions
permitted due to the elected sale-are far from inconsequential. The
new company stands to save millions of dollars each year well into the
future.55 These deductions were not available to Founders Co. and
would not be available to Public Co. absent the steps described above
and absent the election to treat the transaction as a sale in the
supercharged deal structure.
Public Co. and its investors obviously reap valuable benefits in
this innovative deal (they have access to new tax assets absent in the
traditional IPO), but there is also a major drawback. The deal is likely
51. Preexisting tax assets residing inside the company may include items such as
deductible net operating losses, tax credits and so forth. Willens, supra note 41, at 1.
52. The parties make a section 338(h)(10) election to treat the transfer of subsidiary stock
as an asset sale, triggering a step-up in basis. See supra note 50 (discussing the details of the
I.R.C. § 338(h)(10) election). In this supercharged IPO structure, the selling founders must sell at
least 50% of the Public Co. stock within 2 years, which may force a quicker exit than intended.
See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200427011 (Oct. 6, 2003) (private letter ruling regarding GE/Genworth
IPO and discussing the election); Willens, supra note 16, at 661 (same); see also supra note 50.
Furthermore, the Founders effectively pay tax up front on all the built-in gain, albeit at the
lower capital gains rate. I.R.C. §§ 1(f), 1221-23. Recall from above that the traditional IPO
involved only the company's sale of stock to the public, no transfer of assets. See supra note 46.
53. See supra notes 50-51.
54. See supra notes 42-43, 45, and accompanying text.
55. See generally Robert Willens, ILFC Will Exit the AIG Family with a Valuable 'Basis
Step-Up," WILLENS REP., Sept. 3, 2011 (stating that basis step-up can save companies billions in
taxation, if not eliminate the tax bill altogether).
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to generate substantial taxes on Founders Co. and its owners.56 The
important takeaway for purposes of this Article is the fact that in the
traditional IPO structure, there were no new tax assets created, but
there were also no immediate tax burdens triggered. These two
factors-new tax assets plus new tax liabilities-are the reasons for
the emergence of supercharged IPOs.
Founders Co. must pay tax on the sale in the supercharged
IPO, but Public Co. agrees to compensate Founders Co. for incurring
this tax with a TRA. The typical TRA requires Public Co. to pay
Founders Co. 85% of the tax benefits realized as a result of the tax
savings that were not available in the traditional IPO. Above we noted
that if Public Co. amortized its new asset, for example, goodwill worth
$15 million ratably over fifteen years, it would take a deduction of
$1 million a year and would save $5.25 million in taxes over the
amortization period.57 If the parties executed a TRA, Public Co. would
be required to pay Founders Co. 85% of this amount, or $4,462,500.
The timing of the individual payments corresponds to the deductions
as they are used to reduce the corporate tax burden. Public Co., in
other words, makes the TRA payments to the founders as it realizes
the tax savings and not before that time.58 Figure 2 is a simplified
depiction of a supercharged IPO in which Founders Co. exacts
payments from Public Co. through a TRA in return for allowing Public
56. This double tax is associated with the fact that the parties elected to treat the deal as a
sale of assets and not a mere contribution of property to a controlled corporation. See supra note
49. Founders Co. may suffer a taxable gain at the subsidiary level, depending on a number of
factors such as the amount of unrealized gain and the availability of net operating losses.
Moreover, to the extent that Founders Co. has appreciated in value, the original owner-founders
may still have to pay a second level of tax when they sell or liquidate Founders Co. MARTIN D.
GINSBURG ET AL., MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND BUYoUTS T 405 (2011) (discussing tax
consequences); Willens, supra note 16, at 661 (same). The basis step-up occurs when Founders
Co. contributes stock, assets, or subsidiary interests to Public Co. in a busted 351 transaction-a
strategy that the buyers almost always prefer and gives the sellers' some initial hesitation. See
GINSBURG ET AL., supra, 405-06; Willens, supra note 16, at 661; see also discussion supra note
50.
57. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text; see also Rosen & Furci, supra note
17, at 9.
58. Rosen & Furci, supra note 17, at 9. The amounts transferred under the TRA are
determined on an annual basis, comparing Public Co.'s actual tax liability to its notional tax
liability as if such deductions were unavailable. Public Co. makes a payment equal to 85% of that
difference per the parties' TRA, although some agreements indicate that the pre-IPO investors
can accelerate the payments. An interesting feature of the TRA payments is linked to the effects
of the obligation going forward. Because each TRA payment is viewed as part of the purchase
price of the stock or partnership interest by Public Co., every payment causes the basis in the




Co. to benefit from the tax assets that were transferred and created in
the multistep transaction.










Note: As described in the text, Founders Co. first transfers its subsidiary to Public
Co. in exchange for stock; then Founders Co. sells the stock to the public and at the
same time executes a TRA with Public Co. Ultimately, Public Co. will make
payments to Founders Co. in the post-IPO period per the terms of the TRA.
Many IPO commentators have noted that it may not appear
rational for the parties to agree to the supercharged deal because it is
possible that the net costs to Founders Co. will equal (or exceed) the
net benefits to Public Co.-making the deal complicated without any
payoff.5 9 This potential drawback, however, is addressed by the fact
that the deals often involve a partnership and a corporation, rather
than two corporations.60 When Founders Co. is operating as a
partnership for tax purposes (Founders LLC), it will be subject to
fewer and lower tax liabilities than the tax benefits obtained by Public
Co.-a reality that exists due to the differential tax rates applied to
59. GINSBURG ETAL., supra note 56, 405-06.
60. Robert Willens, "Up-C" Incorporations Feature "Tax Receivable Agreements," 5 WILLENS
REP. 1 (2011) (the rules are even more "felicitous" when partnerships sell assets to public
corporations in the context of an IPO); Did You Know ... Benefits of Structuring an IPO as an
"Up-C," THIS MONTH IN M&A (Wash. Nat'l Tax Servs./PricewaterhouseCoopers), Oct. 2011, at 1,
2, http://perma.cclP6RQ-6X42 [hereinafter Did You Know] (discussing how the new IPO
structure involving partnerships and corporations can provide selling partners with up to 30-
40% more in compensation).
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these two different types of entities.61 We discuss this tax-arbitrage
opportunity, and the way that all the parties divide the surplus, in
more detail below and in the Appendix. We find that this arbitrage
opportunity helps to explain the popularity of supercharged IPOs.
In some more recent supercharged IPOs, however, the deal
structure begins to look substantially fishier from the perspective of
Public Co. and the investors. For example, the parties engage in an
IPO that looks very much like that presented in Figure 2, but they do
not elect to treat the transaction as a sale of assets for tax purposes.62
This eliminates the two effects discussed above. First, while Public Co.
inherits Founders Co.'s preexisting tax assets, it does not gain the
benefits associated with newly created tax assets.63 Second, failure to
treat the transaction as a sale eliminates the tax liability on Founders
Co. and its owners.64 In short, the substance of this deal looks very
much like the traditional IPO-in the sense that it does not create
new tax assets nor generate a tax burden-and yet the form of the
deal is akin to the supercharged IPO, and the parties execute a TRA,
enabling the founders to share in the value of the underlying tax
assets transferred.
Why the parties would pursue this strategy is related to
investors' perceived failure to understand or value tax assets
accurately. While tax assets, as we know, are simply the estimated
savings associated with deductions and credits, and while they are
61. The basic structure of the deal is the same when "Founders LLC" is organized as a
partnership-the founders simply sell their partnership interests to Public Co. in exchange for
cash or stock. See Mark Silverman et al., Thinking Outside the Box and Inside the Circle (or
Triangle?): Use of LLCs in Consolidated Return Context, in Corporate Acquisitions, and
Otherwise, in the Public Space, in 8 THE CORPORATE TAX PRACTICE SERIES (2010); Eric Sloan,
Partnerships in the Public Space, in THE CORPORATE TAX PRACTICE SERIES, supra; Willens,
supra note 60, at 1; Did You Know?, supra note 60, at 2-3.
Because partnerships do not pay an entity-level tax, there is no tax owed at the entity
level, nor any tax associated with the distribution of cash to the selling partners. Willens, supra
note 60, at 1; Did You Know?, supra note 60, at 2-3. And generally speaking, the sale of a
partnership is treated as the sale of a capital asset, and so selling partners pay tax on any gains
at the lower long-term capital gains rate. Willens, supra note 60, at 1; Did You Know?, supra
note 60, at 2-3. On the other side of the transaction, Public Co. is still treated as purchasing
goodwill, amortizable at the higher ordinary-income rate of 35%. Willens, supra note 60, at 1;
Did You Know?, supra note 60, at 2-3. This tax arbitrage-selling goodwill at capital gains rates
while generating deductions at ordinary-income rates-made supercharged IPOs especially
attractive for companies that operated as partnerships before going public. Willens, supra note
60, at 1; Did You Know?, supra note 60, at 2-3.
62. Robert Willens, Is an NOL "Personal" to the Shareholders?, WILLENS BuLL., Oct. 8,
2010, at 1 (noting that the new trend is to execute a TRAs without the elections to treat the
transaction as a sale).
63. See supra notes 50-61 and accompanying text.
64. See supra notes 50-61 and accompanying text.
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listed on the company's balance sheet, many believe that public
investors simply do not account for these types of assets when
purchasing stock. The lack of knowledge may be due to the assets'
esoteric nature or perhaps to investment banks' choice to disregard
these assets when valuing a company for IPO purposes.65 Whatever
the reason, if investors refuse to pay for the assets that reside inside
the company at the time of a stock purchase, then it is rational for
Founders Co. to retain this value with the help of a TRA.66
Owners of private companies, in short, have adopted a complex
series of steps to take their businesses public and now routinely
demand large payments from public companies in the post-IPO period.
One justification for these innovative IPOs relates to the tax liability
that the owners suffer in order to generate new tax assets and the
opportunity for tax arbitrage. A second justification revolves around
the idea that investors fail to pay for the preexisting tax assets that
the new public company inherits.67 Various commentators argue that
owners are simply enhancing the efficiency of the deals and assuring
they receive a fair price for their business, while others argue owners
are nothing more than thieves taking advantage of new companies
and public investors.68 After all, it is unclear whether IPO investors
properly discount the price to reflect the removal of tax assets through
a TRA. If they do not, then TRAs amount to little more than a complex
scheme to steal corporate assets. We empirically investigate these
theories below,69 but we first note that all companies going public
divulge the details of the TRA well before the IPO takes place.
65. Rosen & Furci, supra note 17, at 9.
66. To understand the justification for this newer wave of supercharged IPOs more fully,
suppose Founders Co. owns exactly one asset: an oyster with a valuable pearl that cannot be
harvested for three years. Also imagine that Founders Co. would like to sell the entire asset, but
the investors value only the shell and not the pearl (either because the purchaser does not
understand the nature of the hidden gem or because it simply desires to own the shell itself and
nothing else). Founders Co. has several options: (1) refuse to sell, (2) sell but demand an up-front
price that reflects the value of the hidden pearl, or (3) sell the shell and retain the rights to the
pearl when it becomes available three years hence. If Founders Co. selects the third option, the
parties will execute a supplemental contract provision that supercharges the deal with a "pearl
receivable agreement."
The key question that must be asked with respect to this newer wave of supercharged
IPOs is this: does the purchase price reflect the true value of the company, along with its tax
assets, at the time of the IPO, or are investors refusing to pay for these assets? Finding the
answer to this question is important because it will settle a debate among scholars and
commentators with respect to the underlying motivation of the second generation of
supercharged IPOs. See supra notes 11-20 and accompanying text.
67. See supra notes 50-61 and accompanying text.
68. See supra notes 11-20 and accompanying text.
69. See infra notes 126-59 and accompanying text.
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C. Company Disclosures and Risk Projections
While supercharged IPOs are controversial and subject to
widespread debate, a company that goes public must disclose the
details of the TRA in the prospectus and attach a copy of the TRA to
its SEC filings.70 Not only are the terms of the TRA and the cash
payments disclosed to investors at the time of the IPO,71 the potential
risks of entering into this agreement are also outlined. Payments
under the TRA are contingent on Public Co.'s income; that is to say,
absent taxable income, the amortization deductions are worthless to
Public Co., so the new company must operate at a profit to gain
advantage of the tax deductions. This reality poses a risk that neither
Public Co. nor the owner-founders will actually receive benefits
identified in the TRA. 72 Moreover, the IRS could scrutinize the tax
70. The Securities Act of 1933 requires issuers to disclose material information to investors,
and section 11 of the Act allows investors to sue with respect to material misstatements or
omissions in the prospectus or registration statement. 15 U.S.C. § 77(f), (j), (k) (2012). This law
explains why the IPO innovators cannot keep the details of the deal secret in order to profit from
the idea. For a discussion of patented tax advice, see Anish Parikh, Comment, The Proliferation
of Tax Strategy Patents: Has Patenting Gone Too Far?, 7 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 202
(2007).
71. To give just one example, Evercore Partners (the owner-founders of the firm) filed
documents with the SEC containing language describing the terms of their TRA along with the
relevant tax-code provisions and the advantages to Evercore, Inc. (Public Co. in our discussion
above) associated with the structure of the deal and, by implication, its shareholders in the
following language:
The exchanges may result in increases in the tax basis of the tangible and intangible
assets of Evercore LP [the owner-founders] that otherwise would not have been
available. These increases in tax basis would increase (for tax purposes) amortization
and, therefore, reduce the amount of tax that we would otherwise be required to pay
in the future. . . . We [i.e. Public Co.] have entered into a tax receivable
agreement . .. that provides for the payment by us to an exchanging Evercore partner
[i.e an owner-founder] of 85% of the amount of cash savings, if any, in U.S. federal,
state and local income tax that we actually realize as a result of these increases in tax
basis. We expect to benefit from the remaining 15% of cash savings, if any, in income
tax that we realize.
Evercore Inv. Grp. LLC, Registration Statement (Form S-1) (Apr. 20, 2007), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1360901/000119312507086555/dsl.htm.
72. These risks, and others, were identified by Fortress Investment Group at the time of
their supercharged IPO, and outlined in the SEC filings:
Although we [i.e. Public Co.] are not aware of any issue that would cause the IRS to
challenge a tax basis increase, our principals [i.e. the owner-founders] will not
reimburse the corporate taxpayers for any payments that have been previously made
under the tax receivable agreement. . . . The corporate taxpayers' ability to achieve
benefits from any tax basis increase, and the payments to be made under this
agreement, will depend upon a number of factors, including the timing and amount of
our [i.e. Public Co.'s] future income.
Fortress Inv. Grp. LLC, Registration Statement (Form S-1) (Feb. 2, 2007), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1380393/000095013607000635/filel.htm.
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components of the supercharged IPO, jeopardizing the value of the tax
assets and the TRA to both Public Co. and the owner-founders.
Because of the amount of money at stake and the negative view
that many experts and commentators have of TRAs (e.g., describing
them as "underhanded," and "one-sided"73), Public Co.'s obligation
could also theoretically be challenged down the road by angry
shareholders who feel cheated.74
In the next Section, we explore competing explanations for why
the parties would agree to a supercharged IPO notwithstanding the
deals' complexity, bad press, and risks. As our discussion illustrates,
some explanations suggest that supercharged IPOs are a very good
way for the parties to reduce tax costs, while others imply
opportunism on the part of the owner-founders.
III. COMPETING THEORIES OF FINANCIAL INNOVATION:
DISCOVERY AND DIFFUSION
Innovation in the financial context is not new; historians have
documented creative solutions to financial problems for centuries.75
For the most part, scholars and policymakers have applauded these
efforts as important means for making markets complete and efficient.
When it comes to policymaking choices, Federal Reserve Chairman
Ben Bernanke noted in 2007, "We should also always keep in view the
enormous economic benefits that flow from a healthy and innovative
73. See supra notes 11-20 and accompanying text.
74. We have not identified any litigation involving supercharged IPOs. In other contexts,
however, TRAs have been the subject of litigation. See, e.g., Third Nat'l Bank in Nashville v.
Wedge Grp. Inc., 882 F.2d 1087 (6th Cir. 1989) (defendant denies liability under the TRA).
Shareholders have also sued in the IPO context, although not with respect to the existence of the
TRAs that were involved. See, e.g., Peter Lattman, Court Revives Suit over Blackstone I.P.O.,
http://perma.cc/WLU3-LSFQ (dealbook.nytimes.com, archived Feb. 3, 2014).
75. Political and religious organizations, for example, have long barred or extensively
limited bankers' ability to charge interest, but these restrictions have never eliminated the active
market for credit. Instead, lenders have found novel ways to obtain interest payments,
sometimes at usury rates, with the help of third parties, unusual contracts, and a variety of
other means. See Michael Knoll, The Ancient Roots of Modern Financial Innovation: The Early
History of Regulatory Arbitrage, 87 OR. L. REV. 93 (2008) (tracing the roots of put-call parity to
its ancient origins); see also KRISTEN STILT, IsLAMIC LAW IN ACTION (2011) (looking at the
interaction between Islamic law and society); Jonathon Barron Baskin, The Development of
Corporate Financial Markets in Britain and the United States, 1600-1914: Overcoming
Asymmetric Information, 62 Bus. HIST. REV. 199 (1988) (tracing the "evolution of corporate
finance" from its beginning in British trading companies to its modern use in the United States);
Knoll, supra, at 101-13 (looking at the history of put-call parity through Islamic, Jewish, and
Christian history); Larry Neal, Trust Companies and Financial Innovation, 1897-1914, 45 BUS.
HIST. REV. 35 (1971) (assessing the "innovative role" of the trust company in the United States in
the period after the depression of the 1890s until World War I).
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financial sector. The increasing sophistication and depth of financial
markets promote economic growth by allocating capital where it can
be most productive."76 Two years after making this statement, and in
the wake of the 2008 financial collapse, Chairman Bernanke
acknowledged that financial innovation also has its drawbacks:
"Indeed, innovation, once held up as the solution, is now more often
than not perceived as the problem . .. we have seen only too clearly
during the past two years, innovation that is inappropriately
implemented can be positively harmful."77
Good or bad, financial innovators are part of the economic
landscape, and for this reason, it is useful to understand the
environment that fosters creative financing, the factors that enable its
diffusion, and the chosen allocation of costs and benefits between and
among the parties. Scholars have set forth a range of theories that
address these issues,78 and the goal in this Section is to provide a brief
outline of the extant literature as it applies to supercharged IPOs. We
then offer hypotheses with respect to why supercharged IPOs emerged
and why they spread across geographic zones and industries.
A. Innovation and Discovery: Five Competing Models
In a perfectly efficient world, free of taxes, regulations, and
transaction costs, financial innovation would provide little or no
benefit and would likely play an insignificant role in the economy.79
Markets, however, are neither perfectly efficient nor free from
regulation, and as we know, financial innovation is pervasive. The
extant theoretical literature has converged on a range of factors, often
76. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Speech to the
Federal Reserve of Atlanta's 2007 Financial Markets Conference, Sea Island, Georgia (May 15,
2007) (transcript available at http://perma.cc/D6YP-WXRA); see also Maxwell Watson et al.,
International Capital Markets: Developments and Prospects 15 (Int'l Monetary Fund, Paper No.
43, 1986) (on balance, the innovations have been almost certainly beneficial for the system as a
whole).
77. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Speech Given at
the Federal Reserve System's Sixth Biennial Community Affairs Research Conference,
Washington, D.C. (Apr. 17, 2009) (transcript available at http://perma.cc/N9FP-72FB).
78. See, e.g., Peter Tufano, Financial Innovation, in HANDBOOK OF ECONOMICS OF FINANCE
(George Constantinides et al. eds., 2002) (outlining theories of financial innovation); W. Scott
Frame & Lawrence J. White, Empirical Studies of Financial Innovation: Lots of Talk, Little
Action?, 42 J. ECON. LIT. 116 (2004) (same); Robert C. Merton & Zvi Bodie, The Design of
Financial Systems: Towards a Synthesis of Functions and Structure (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 10,620, 2004) (discussing financial innovation, neoclassical
finance, frictions, and behavioral economics).
79. Tufano, supra note 78, at 5 (suggesting financial innovation in a world free of
"imperfections" would benefit no one).
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believed to operate simultaneously, that motivate financial experts to
innovate.80 While the mainstream account often assumes that investor
demand primarily drives financial innovation,81 we will see that
questionable and self-serving motives can also inspire financial
ingenuity to the detriment of shareholders and investors.
1. Taxes, Regulations, and Accounting Standards
Taxes, regulations, and formal industry standards are widely
viewed as an impediment to market activities, but they also operate as
a major incentive to innovate.82 Merton Miller, along with many other
scholars in a wide range of fields, have discussed and debated
financial creativity.83 All agree that financial engineers spend
significant time and energy avoiding taxes,84 maneuvering around
regulations,85 and devising creative accounting and reporting
strategies.86
80. Bruno Rossignoli & Francesca Arnaboldi, Financial Innovation: Theoretical Issues and
Empirical Evidence in Italy and in the UK, 56 J. INT. REV. ECON. 275, 280-81 (2009) (stating
that various drivers of innovation exist and tend to work simultaneously); Tufano, supra note 78,
at 10 (noting how all the stimuli operate together to promote innovation).
81. FRANKLIN ALLEN & DOUGLAS GALE, FINANcIAL INNOVATION AND RISK SHARING 5-10
(1994) (stating that demand drives innovation); Nicola Gennailoli et al., Neglected Risks,
Financial Innovation, and Financial Fragility, 104 J. FIN. ECON. 452, 452 (2012) (discussing how
episodes of financial innovation share a common narrative and it begins with investor demand);
Josh Lerner & Peter Tufano, The Consequences of Financial Innovation: A Counterfactual
Research Agenda 10 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16,780, 2011) (same).
82. Darrell Duffie & Rohit Rahi, Financial Market Innovation and Security Design: An
Introduction, 65 J. ECON. THEORY 1, 2 (1995) ("New securities are often designed in response to
accounting standards, regulations and tax codes.").
83. Michael Carter, Financial Innovation and Financial Fragility, 23 J. ECON. ISSUES 779,
783 (1989) (discussing how tax and regulation drive innovation); Merton Miller, Financial
Innovation: The Last Twenty Years and the Next, 21 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANALYSIS 459, 459 (1986)
("The major impulses to successful financial innovations [over the last twenty years] have come
from regulations and taxes.").
84. See generally Edward D. Kleinbard, Equity Derivative Products: Financial Innovation's
Newest Challenge to the Tax System, 69 TEX. L. REV 1319 (1991) (discussing time and energy
devoted to innovation in financial context); Charles R.P. Pouncy, Contemporary Financial
Innovation: Orthodoxy and Alternative, 51 SMU L. REV. 505 (1998) (same); Alvin C. Warren, Jr.,
Financial Contract Innovation and Income Tax Policy, 107 HARV. L. REV. 460 (1993) (same).
85. Scholars have noted that innovators often create means to avoid regulation by designing
investment opportunities in unregulated or minimally regulated industries. Banking policy, for
example, long limited banks' ability to pay interest on savings accounts, and this led nonbank
intermediaries who operated outside the jurisdiction of the banking regulators to devise money
market and mutual fund accounts that mimicked the attributes of savings deposits but could pay
interest. Carter, supra note 83, at 782-84; Henry T.C. Hu, Swaps, the Modern Process of
Financial Innovation and the Vulnerability of a Regulatory Paradigm, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 333
(1989); Pouncy, supra note 84, at 546-48; Joseph C. Shenker & Anthony J. Colletta, Asset
Securitization: Evolution, Current Issues and New Frontiers, 69 TEX. L. REV 1369 (1991); James
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Tax rules addressing goodwill may have played an important
role in the rise of the supercharged IPO. Prior to 1993, the cost of
creating or acquiring goodwill could not always be amortized, but with
the adoption of Internal Revenue Code § 197, goodwill acquirers are
now able to amortize the cost of this asset ratably over a fifteen-year
period.87 Because goodwill is often the most valuable asset sold in an
IPO, this legal change effectively enabled investors to "recover"
(through tax deductions obtained by the company) a portion of their
investment if the deal was structured as a "sale" to give Public Co. the
ability to amortize its assets. In short, due to § 197, the true cost of
buying shares of stock in an IPO would be substantially less than the
nominal or "headline" price in light of the later cash savings
associated with the tax deductions for goodwill.
The 1993 tax reform was followed by a major change in
accounting standards, making goodwill even more valuable to the
company. Prior to 2001, companies were required to charge a portion
of the amortized goodwill to their income statement-signaling the
depletion of an asset and having the effect of reducing earnings and
showing smaller company profits. In 2001, the Financial Accounting
Standards Board issued Financial Accounting Standard ("FAS") 142,88
Tobin, Financial Innovation and Deregulation in Perspective, 3 MONETARY & ECON. STUD. 19
(1985).
86. Many have argued that accounting firms are uniquely positioned to engage in financial
innovation given the background expertise in accounting, taxation, and regulations, and
numerous firms now market themselves as experts not only in accounting services, but also in
the design of "structured investment vehicles" that enable firms to creatively avoid the limits of
accounting standards and tax rules. Patricia J. Arnold, Global Financial Crisis: The Challenge to
Accounting Research, 34 AcCT. ORG. & SOC'Y 803, 804 (2009); Eric R. Hake, Financial Illusion:
Accounting for Profits in an Enron World, 39 J. ECON. ISSUES 595, 603 (2005); Norio Sawabe, Co-
Evolution of Accounting Rules and Creative Accounting Instruments-The Case of a Rules-Based
Approach to Accounting Standard Setting, 1 EVOLUTIONARY & INST. ECON. REV. 177 (2005); Atul
K. Shah, Creative Compliance in Financial Reporting, 21 ACCT. ORG. & SocY 23 (1996)
[hereinafter Shah, Creative Compliance]; Atul K. Shah, Exploring the Influences and Constraints
on Creative Accounting in the United Kingdom, 7 EUR. ACCT. REV. 83 (1998) [hereinafter Shah,
Exploring]; Atul K. Shah, Regulatory Arbitrage Through Financial Innovation, 10 ACCT.
AUDITING & ACCOUNTABILITY 85 (1996) [hereinafter Shah, Regulatory Arbitrage]; see also D.
MACBARNET & C. WHELAN, CREATIVE ACCOUNTING AND THE CROSS-EYED JAVELIN THROWER
(1999).
87. I.R.C. § 197 (2012). For a good discussion of how and why the change in the tax rules
associated with goodwill has led to the proliferation of IPOs, see Romina Weiss, Fifteen Years of
Antichurning: It's Time to Make Butter, TAX NOTES, Jan. 12, 2009, at 227, 234-36 (tax and
accounting rules motivate innovate deals); see generally Robert Willens, Depreciating (Not
Deprecating) Matt Kemp, WILLENS REP., May 31, 2012, same).
88. Goodwill and intangible assets are not presumed to be wasting assets; instead, they are
presumed to have indefinite useful lives and are tested periodically for impairment. See
GOODWILL AND OTHER INTANGIBLE ASSETS, Summary of Statement No. 142 (Fin. Accounting
Standards Bd. 2001), available at http://perma.ccl4UH9-KAVG.
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eliminating this mandate. The importance of this reform should not be
underestimated: it led to a vast increase in many companies' annual
reported profits, often by billions of dollars.89 In short, the current tax
and accounting rules together permit companies to reduce their
taxable income through amortization deductions while at the same
time keeping their reported income to investors high. A company that
is able to take advantage of both § 197 and FAS 142, in effect,
straddles the best of both worlds. Because the supercharged IPO
enables Public Co. to do just this (it gives the company the ability to
deduct the cost of goodwill, but these deductions do not offset earnings
reported to investors), the reforms create a powerful incentive to
undertake this type of deal when substantial goodwill exists inside
Founders Co.
The opportunity for tax arbitrage provides a second reason for
the supercharged IPO. Recall that the deal generates new tax assets
for Public Co., but at a tax cost to Founders Co. If the costs and
benefits are exactly equal-say Public Co. amortizes an asset at a 35%
tax rate and Founders Co. pays tax at a 35% rate on the TRA
payments-it would not make sense to supercharge the IPO. If,
however, Public Co. is able to take tax deductions at a higher tax rate
than that imposed on the taxable income received by Founders Co.,
then a supercharged IPO is tax efficient. A tax-rate differential, if it
exists, is a second possible explanation for the emergence of the
supercharged IPO.90 Table Al (presented in the Appendix) provides
numbers confirming that tax-arbitrage opportunities are an essential
component to the supercharged IPO.
The tax and accounting theories of financial innovation
generate two testable hypotheses: the parties will supercharge the
IPO if (1) Founders Co. has substantial goodwill or (2) an opportunity
to engage in tax arbitrage exists. In Part IV below, we investigate
these two hypotheses with empirical data and find that tax arbitrage
plays a much stronger role in the parties' choice to supercharge the
IPO than the presence of goodwill.91
2. Information Asymmetry
A second theory of financial innovation relates to information
asymmetry: circumstances in which one party has more or better
89. Ronald J. Huefner & James A. Largay III, The Effects of the New Goodwill Accounting
Rules on Financial Statements, http://perma.cc/EV6M-9BVV (nyssepa.org, archived Feb. 3, 2014).
90. Willens, supra note 60, at 1.
91. See infra notes 136-59 and accompanying text.
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information than the other, creating an imbalance of power and
setting the stage for opportunistic behavior. This situation often
motivates the less informed party to find creative solutions to limit
unfair advantages or equalize available information.92 The less
informed parties in the IPO context, of course, are the public
investors. A company's owner-founders have better information with
respect to the value of the underlying assets, especially the tax
assets.93
To understand why information asymmetry works to the
disadvantage of the company and its investors, recall that in many
supercharged IPOs, Public Co. is able to amortize goodwill. The
amortization deductions are linked to the fair market value of the
goodwill; overstating the value of goodwill would lead to high tax
deductions but could also attract unwanted IRS scrutiny and a
possible deficiency notice. Public Co. and the shareholders, therefore,
have an incentive to link the payments to the actual tax deductions
obtained, thereby assuring that the owner-founders have a stake in
the deductions as well as the accuracy of the underlying fair market
value reported to the IRS at the time of the sale. An up-front payment
by Public Co., untethered to the tax savings actually received down
the road, would incentivize the owner-founders to overstate the value
of the tax assets in an effort to convince the company to overpay for
the tax assets obtained in the IPO. The TRA simultaneously operates
to assure that relevant information is shared between the parties, and
to restrict opportunism.
The information asymmetry, however, may also work to the
disadvantage of the owner-founders. Investors, as discussed above in
the context of the second wave of supercharged IPOs, may suffer an
information deficit with respect to the company's tax assets, whether
they are newly created by the deal or preexisting and transferred in
the deal. If investors simply do not account for the value of these
assets at the time they purchase the stock, then owner-founders'
decision to supercharge the IPO with a TRA is rational because it
assures they are compensated for the all the assets transferred. In
short, if investors refuse to pay for a portion of the company's assets
due to the lack of information, owner-founders sensibly extract
payment for those assets down the road with the help of the TRA.
92. Paul Healy & Krishna G. Palepu, Information Asymmetry, Corporate Disclosure, and
the Capital Markets: A Review of the Empirical Disclosure Literature, 31 J. AccT. & ECON. 405
(2001) (discussing solutions to information asymmetry).
93. See, e.g., Lattman, supra note 74 (discussing shareholders suing Blackstone because
company allegedly withheld information from public investors at the time of the IPO).
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Under this theory of the deal, absent the TRA, owner-founders would
not be able to obtain a fair price for the company as it goes public.
The supercharged IPO theoretically cures the problem of
information asymmetry in both the contexts just noted, but there is
also a third possibility: the innovation may create informational
problems. Commentators and critics have argued that supercharged
IPOs are "underhanded," "one-sided," and "bizarre," on the grounds
that they are complicated and virtually incomprehensible.94 Indeed,
one commentator notes that, in analyzing a recent IPO, he "missed the
major thrust of The Carlyle Group's byzantine 'cash tax savings'" plan
associated with the TRA. This commentator noted that he "mistakenly
thought Carlyle's co-founders were being indemnified against any
future tax increase on carried interest. Instead it's a co-founder cash
bleeding of affiliates."95 The allegation is that owner-founders
deceptively add complex provisions into the IPO, enabling the owner
to steal from unsuspecting and confused public investors through
large TRA payments.96 In short, it is argued, the supercharged IPO is
not a means to compensate founders for the tax costs they incur for
creating and transferring valuable tax assets or for assets left
unvalued by the investors-it is mere theft.
Some leading practitioners share this dark view of
supercharged IPOs and TRAs. As one explained, "I view TRAs as
much less about tax innovation and much more about improper
accounting and investor unsophistication." He elaborated, "The main
feature of TRAs is that selling shareholders have convinced the public
that they are indeed transferring a benefit to the IPO company and
have obfuscated the potential cost to the IPO company." The sellers
explain the supercharged IPO in published documents, but investors
may not account for the future TRA payments in the stock pricing. "In
my experience," he explained, "except in extraordinarily unusual
situations, there is no real negotiation because, at the end of the day,
despite extensive disclosure, the TRA doesn't affect the IPO price."97
The critics may have a point: if the experts fail to detect and
understand the TRA, the investing public will surely fail to
comprehend the nature of the agreement, making it a perfect vehicle
for owners to quietly and unfairly extract money from the company.
94. See supra notes 11-20 and accompanying text.
95. Carlyle's "Cash Tax Savings" Won't Go to Unit Holders, supra note 14.
96. Nigel Jenkinson et al., Financial Innovation: What Have We Learnt, 2008 Q. BULL. 330
(noting that financial engineering can improve options for households and companies, but can
also create market imperfections and unexpected information asymmetries).
97. See Interview with NYC Practitioner (on file with the authors).
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Owners have long rationalized supercharged IPOs on the ground that
they incur costs in creating tax assets for Public Co, or, alternatively,
that investors refuse to pay for preexisting tax assets-but if these
justifications do not hold up empirically, then the owners may have
adopted an underhanded scheme, as critics suggest.
The information-asymmetry theory of innovation leads to two
distinct hypotheses associated with information deficits and founders'
opportunism. Specifically, this theory suggests that (1) investors'
information deficits vis-A-vis existing tax assets will lead owner-
founders to include the TRA in the IPO documents to assure they
receive compensation for assets transferred, and (2) even in the
absence of investors' information deficit, owner-founders may
opportunistically slip the TRA into the IPO documents on the theory
that investors will not focus on the minor details of the deal. In the
empirical component of our paper, we find surprising results with
respect to information asymmetry and opportunism.98
3. Risk Aversion
Students of financial innovation argue that risk is a key
motivator for creativity.99 Financial risk is often associated with
market fluctuation, but the threat of political, social, and legal change
may also pose unwanted and undesirable risks.100 Inventions enabling
individuals and entities to manage these risks are ubiquitous and
often involve complex products, instruments, and processes.101
98. See infra notes 136-59 and accompanying text.
99. C. SMITH ET AL., MANAGING FINANCIAL BUSINESS 20 (1990) (stating that risk is a key
factor in motivating innovations); VOLKER ScHMID, FINANCIAL INNOVATION WITH A PARTICULAR
VIEW ON THE ROLE OF BANKS 4-6 (2004) (same); Frame & White, supra note 78, at 8 (same);
Tufano, supra note 78, at 20 (same); see also MILIKEN INST., FINANCIAL INNOVATIONS FOR
CATASTROPHIC RISK (2008), available at http://perma.cclV2EU-S275 (discussing mechanism to
insure against earthquakes, hurricanes, terrorism, and so forth).
100. In fact, the regulators' response is often an expected feature of innovation. See Zachary
J. Gubler, The Financial Innovation Process: Theory and Application, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 55, 55-
61 (2011) (exploring various ways to regulate financial innovation with the help of new
institutional economics); Samuel M. Kidder, What's Your Position? Amending the Bankruptcy
Disclosure Rules to Keep Pace with Financial Innovation, 58 UCLA L. REV. 803, 804-07 (2011)
(exploring the problem of "empty creditors" and appropriate policy reform); Robert C. Merton, A
Functional Perspective of Financial Intermediation, 24 FIN. MGMT. 23, 30 (1995) (discussing the
innovation-regulation dialectic); Frank Partnoy, Financial Innovation in Corporate Law, 31 J.
CORP. L. 799, 819-20 (2006) (exploring how corporate law might address the problem of hybrid
financial instruments); see also Dionisis Th. Philippas & Costas Siriopoulos, Influence of
Financial Innovation to the Validation of Operational Risk, 35 MANAGERIAL FIN. 940, 941 (2009)
(stating risk can be associated with failed processes, people, systems, or external events).
101. Scholars have noted that foreign exchange futures, swaps, options, interest rate futures,
and so forth all emerged due to perceived uncertainty in the markets and the desire to eliminate
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At first cut, it may appear that the supercharged IPOs pose
greater risks than a traditional IPO. First, if tax arbitrage motivates
the supercharged deal, the parties risk legal reform that removes the
tax-rate disparity. Indeed, various members of Congress have
critiqued the current rate differentials as unfair and inappropriate,
and have proposed legislation that would force recognition of income
by owner-founders at a higher tax rate, eliminating the arbitrage
opportunity.102 This risk-that tax costs will exceed benefits down the
road-provides an incentive for the owner-founders to negotiate an
immediate payout (through an increased stock price at the time of the
IPO or a lump-sum payment simultaneous with the IPO). A TRA tied
to the company's amortization deductions over the course of fifteen
years, by contrast, subjects the owners to potential and unwanted tax
increases.
Second, as noted above, commentators are widely critical of
supercharged IPOs, and many have noted that bad press alone may
make them a bad idea. If the extensive condemnation and disapproval
emerging in the media ultimately has an effect on the value of the
company, the TRAs' benefits may not be worth the costs. In short, the
number of companies that theoretically could supercharge their IPO
but choose not to may be linked to the risk associated with the bad
press.
There are, however, strong competing reasons for Public Co. to
prefer the TRA over an up-front payment. The tax benefits to Public
Co. are associated with the so-called basis step-up that occurs with the
purchase of goodwill and other assets, but it is possible that the IRS
will disallow or limit that increase in basis in the context of an audit,
as discussed above. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, because
tax assets are linked to a reduction in a company's tax burden
it. A widely admired and relatively new form of catastrophic insurance, often labeled "cat bonds,"
for example, is an innovation that enables individuals to protect against hurricanes,
earthquakes, and even terrorism. See J. David Cummins, CAT Bonds and Other Risk-Link
Securities: State of the Market and Recent Developments, 11 RISK MGMT. & INS. REV. 23, 25-31
(2008) (discussing the many types of CAT bonds available); Neil A. Doherty, Financial
Innovation in the Management of Catastrophe Risk, 10 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 84, 87-92 (1997)
(discussing various design issues associated with successful innovation in this area of insurance);
Tufano, supra note 78, at 20-21 (same). Of course, financial innovation can also create risk for
investors. See Susanne Trimbath, Financial Innovation: Wall Street's False Utopia, 5 J. AccT. &
ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE 108, 108-11 (2009) (explaining that collateral mortgage obligations
were created to spread risk and reduce agency costs but had the opposite effect).
102. See H.R. REP. No. 110-431, at 6-7 (2007) (explaining a provision related to increased
rates that was not part of the final legislation enacted into law); see also GINSBURG ET AL., supra
note 56, at 10 (noting Congress may unwind benefits of the TRA sometime down the road);
Johnston, supra note 10 (critiquing TRAs as fundamentally unfair to taxpayers).
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associated with its taxable income, the company must earn sufficient
income to take advantage of the tax assets. Absent sufficient income,
the tax asset (be it a deduction or credit) could become partially or
fully useless. These risks make it sensible for Public Co. to agree to
make payments contingent on the actual rather than forecasted value
of the tax assets, insuring that Public Co. and its investors pay for
what they actually receive.
If the deal is supercharged not because the owner-founders
created new tax assets, but because they transferred preexisting
assets that investors do not adequately value, then the TRA is
sensible from both Founders Co.'s and the investors' viewpoint. The
TRA ensures that the owner-founders will get paid for the assets and
that, at the same time, the investors need not incur the risk of paying
for assets they do not understand.
The idea that risk aversion plays an important role in the
choice to innovate is widely accepted, and our analysis implies it has
indeed played a role in the use of TRAs. This is a qualitative viewpoint
that our data cannot confirm because companies going public through
a traditional IPO do not announce the reasons for their chosen deal
structures.
Ideally, we would like to compare deals that involved large, up-
front compensation to the owner-founders versus future payments
pursuant to a TRA to assess which party is more risk averse.
Empirically, however, we are unable to examine the parties' level of
risk because every supercharged IPO contains a TRA with virtually
identical terminology, and no alternative payout plans exist. Thus, we
cannot use statistics and data to investigate whether the parties'
aversion to risk plays a role in the design of supercharged IPOs. Given
that 100% of the deal structures include post-IPO payouts and that
the parties explicitly refer to the risks and hazards associated with
TRAs in the SEC filings, it is reasonable to infer that Public Co.'s and
the shareholders' distaste for risk more strongly motivates the design
of supercharged IPOs.
4. Information Costs
A fourth theory of financial innovation relates to information
costs (as distinct from information asymmetry as discussed above).
Here we focus on the costs of searching for, understanding, and
negotiating the terms of an investment. Quite a few scholars have
argued that the presence of these costs provides a critical motivation
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for financial innovation,103 and empirical studies have found that
transaction costs are the causal mechanism for many innovations.104
In the IPO context, experts argue that TRAs are an excellent means to
simplify the sale of a company, thereby limiting information costs.0 5
In traditional transactions, the share price must account for the value
of tax assets, and valuing these assets requires parties to make
numerous assumptions associated with a potential IRS audit, the
company's future profitability, future legal reform, and the use of
other types of tax-planning strategies, in order to identify the true
value of the tax asset to Public Co. Negotiation and bargaining leads
to delays and may kill the deal altogether.106 TRAs eliminate these
hurdles, making the transaction considerably more straightforward
and simple to execute.107
While many legal and accounting experts believe that TRAs
simplify IPOs, critics have argued that TRAs create complexity and
confusion for investors who are unable to decipher the agreement's
purpose or meaning.108 A complicated deal may, in turn, lead IPO
investors to discount the price they are willing to pay, given the extra
time and energy spent analyzing documents. Or, alternatively, if they
simply do not understand fully the agreement, they may forego the
purchase altogether. These transaction costs raise the question of why
owner-founders would risk market punishment in the form of a lower
price paid for the IPO shares. At the same time, IPOs tend to be
103. See Tufano, supra note 78, at 4-16 (explaining that information costs play a key role in
innovation); Robert C. Merton, On the Application of the Continuous-Time Theory of Finance to
Financial Intermediation and Insurance, 14 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 225, 228-29 (1989)
(same).
104. See John J. McConnell & Eduardo S. Schwartz, The Origin of LYONs: A Case Study in
Financial Innovation, 4 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 40, 40-47 (1992) (describing a case study on
transaction costs). A good example of innovation in this context is related to credit scoring, or the
process of assigning a single quantitative measure to a potential borrower representing an
estimate of the borrower's future loan performance. This innovation allows creditors to lend and
monitor loans without meeting the borrower and provides creditors with cheaper, better
information that will make it more likely that the lender will price loans based on expected risk
rather than refusing to loan monies. See Akhavein et al., supra note 28, at 579-80 (finding
credit-scoring innovation decreased transaction costs); Tufano, supra note 78, at 16 (explaining
ATMs, smart cards, and other examples demonstrate importance of innovation to eliminate
transaction costs).
105. Glenn E. Dance, The Monetization of Tax Benefits Through Tax Receivable Agreements,
10 J. PASSTHROUGH ENTITIES 5, 7 (2007).
106. See generally Robert Willens, HGSI's 'Financial Assets" Are Valuable, WILLENS REP.,
July 9, 2012 (describing a deal killed due to parties' inability to agree on value of tax assets).
107. Id.; Rosen & Furci, supra note 17, at 9.
108. Carlyle's "Cash Tax Savings" Won't Go to Unit Holders, supra note 14 (finding deals
with TRAs too complex to understand fully).
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complex deals by nature. If the investors have already taken a leap of
faith despite this complexity, or have already discounted the price as a
form of market punishment for the complexity, then adding additional
nuance in the form of a TRA may still be rational, on the theory that
the owner-founders are not likely to suffer further penalty by way of
an additional purchase-price reduction. Embedding a TRA into the
deal, in short, may be rational for no purpose other than to extract
easy money in the post-IPO period-support for the critics' view that
the plan is "underhanded." Stated more directly, the owner-founders
may be motivated by the desire to capture the benefits of newly
created tax assets or preexisting tax assets left undervalued by
investors, or they may simply want to extort money from unsuspecting
investors by inserting a TRA into the documents on the theory that
investors will not take notice.
The information-cost theory of financial innovation leads to
three hypotheses, only two of which can be investigated with our data.
First, we cannot test the idea that, due to the cost advantages of a
TRA, owner-founders will utilize supercharged IPOs in lieu of up-front
payments, because every supercharged IPO includes a TRA.
Accordingly, we cannot compare different forms of payment schemes.
The second hypothesis-that the parties will agree to supercharge
their IPO because the benefits of such a deal will exceed its costs-can
be tested by examining the hypotheses outlined above. And the third
hypothesis-that owner-founders will slip a TRA into the IPO
documents for underhanded purposes-can also be tested by
investigating whether complex deals are more likely to include a TRA.
We outline in detail below the empirical strategy for testing these
hypotheses and the others outlined above.109
5. The Macroeconomy
Up to this point, our analyses have focused on factors that
operate in unique ways on the specific parties involved in the
transaction, but macrolevel variables beyond the parties' control may
also affect the choice to supercharge an IPO. Scholars have argued
that market factors are important stimuli to financial innovation.
Some have argued that a growing economy generates high profit levels
along with high levels of expected profits, which then impel creative
financing, new instruments, and an overall bubble of financial
109. See infra notes 136-59 and accompanying text.
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innovation to achieve those profits.110 Other scholars take the position
that, whether or not the business cycle is expanding or contracting,
market participants will innovate in order to improve performance
and maintain a competitive edge-an edge that is maintained only if
companies ceaselessly innovate and improve their products and
processes."'
In short, the macroeconomic theory of financial innovation
posits two hypotheses: (1) a growing economy generates new and
creative deals, such as supercharged IPOs, or, in the alternative, (2)
the economy has no effect because financial experts will innovate in all
economic contexts to maintain their competitive edge. Our empirical
investigation suggests that the business cycle does affect the IPO
markets, but in unexpected ways.112
110. Recently, theorists have argued that an economic expansion and the desire for
continually increasing profits led individuals and firms to innovate in the banking industry,
causing the well-known savings-and-loans crisis in the 1970s and subprime-mortgage crisis in
2007 and 2008. Janet L. Yellen, President & CEO, Fed. Reserve Bank of S.F. Presentation to the
18th Annual Hyman P. Minsky Conference on the State of the U.S. and World Economies: A
Minsky Meltdown: Lessons for Central Bankers (Apr. 16, 2009), available at
http://perma.cc/4RCP-2MR7. Some theorists suggest a feedback loop may exist: financial
innovation responds to volatile markets, which then become less volatile because of the
innovation. Karen E. Dynan et al., Can Financial Innovation Help to Explain the Reduced
Volatility of Economic Activity?, 53 J. MONETARY ECON. 123, 124-25 (2006).
111. See HYMAN MINSKY, STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY (1986) (arguing innovation is
necessary for competitive advantage); MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE STRATEGY 10 (2004)
(arguing innovation is necessary for competitive advantage); David A. Zalewski & Charles J.
Whalen, Towards a More Rapid Recovery: Incorporating Subsidiarity into Macroeconomic Policy,
in FINANCIAL INSTABILITY AND ECONOMIC SECURITY AFrER THE GREAT RECESSION 93, 100-07
(Charles J. Whalen, ed., 2011) (discussing rediscovery of early theorists and the view that
innovation is necessary for competitive advantage); Abir & Chokri, supra note 28, at 17, 18
(arguing innovation is necessary for competitive advantage); Irving Fisher, The Debt Deflation
Theory of Great Depressions, 1 ECONOMETRICA 337, 337-40 (1933) (arguing innovation is
necessary for competitive advantage); Hyman Minsky, The Evolution of Financial Institutions
and the Performance of the Economy, 20 J. ECON. ISSUES 345, 345-52 (1986) (same); Peter W.
Roberts & Raphael Amit, The Dynamics of Innovative Activity and Competitive Advantage: The
Case of Australian Retail Banking, 1981 to 1995, 14 ORGANIZATIONAL SCI. 107, 113-20 (2003)
(arguing innovation is key for competitive advantage). See generally WESLEY C. MITCHELL,
BUSINESS CYCLES (1913) (discussing the theories of business cycles). For useful summaries and
extensions of Minksy's work, see Michael Carter, Financial Innovation and Financial Fragility,
23 J. ECON. ISSUES 779 (1989); Marc Jarsulic, Financial Instability and Income Distribution, 22
J. ECON. ISSUES 545 (1988). See also Richard Bookstaber, Fighting Demons: Addressing the
Perils of Financial Innovation, 29 MULTINATIONAL MONITOR 55, 57 (2008) (discussing hedge fund
managers faced with the choice of increasing leverage to meet target returns or see business
diminish); Michael D. Bordo, An Historical Perspective on the Crisis of 2007-2008, at 6-8 (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14,569, 2008), available at http://perma.cc/RT94-
MRSR (arguing that scholars as early as Wesley Mitchell in 1913 argued that business-cycle
upswings lead to financial innovation).
112. See infra notes 136-59 and accompanying text.
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B. Use and Diffusion: Four Competing Models
We now turn from the drivers of financial engineering to the
parties who use and diffuse the innovation. Scholars have noted that
successful innovations quickly spread and have offered theories for
how and why this diffusion process takes place. Indeed,
notwithstanding the drawbacks associated with their complexity and
the criticisms they generate, one prominent commentator has noted
that supercharged IPOs, along with the attendant TRAs, are becoming
"almost standard procedure."113 In this Section, we discuss the
mechanisms by which the supercharged IPOs may have spread across
geographic areas and industries since the first such deal emerged in
1993.
1. Elite Lawyers and Accountants
TRAs are legal and accounting inventions, coming into
widespread use in 2007 after the tax and accounting reforms were
firmly in place. The quality of the lawyers and accountants working on
the deal may be a strong predictor for the presence of innovative deal
structuring, on the theory that this group closely tracks any and all
reforms that could affect deals and deal structures. More specifically,
students of innovation have found that creative, sophisticated, and
experienced individuals and firms are apt to understand and promote
the use of the most advanced deal structures. Over time, of course,
useful innovations will diffuse more widely and become standard
among both elite and nonelite professionals, as with poison pills and
other takeover defenses. The early adopters, however, are likely to be
elite lawyers and accountants who spend time and energy engineering
the best deal possible for their clients. 114 We test this theory of
diffusion in the empirical component of our study by investigating the
types of lawyers and accountants involved in supercharged IPOs.115
113. Willens, supra note 60, at 1.
114. Many have argued that law and accounting firms are uniquely positioned to engage in
financial innovation given the background expertise in accounting, taxation, and regulations,
and numerous firms now market themselves as experts not only in accounting services, but in
the design of "structured investment vehicles" that enable firms to creatively avoid the limits of
accounting standards and tax rules. Patricia Arnold, Global Financial Crisis: The Challenge to
Accounting Research, 34 ACT. ORGS. & Soc'Y 803, 804 (2009); see Hake, supra note 86, at 603;
Sawabe, supra note 86, at 177-78; Shah, Creative Compliance, supra note 86, at 23-39; Shah,
Exploring, supra note 86, at 83-104; Shah, Regulatory Arbitrage, supra note 86, at 85-104; see
also McBARNET & WHELAN, supra note 86, at 4-12, 269-72.
115. See infra notes 136-59 and accompanying text.
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2. Professional Networks and Geographic Clusters
Innovations often spread because individuals and firms located
in geographic clusters share information about exciting new
innovations with clients, friends, and colleagues. The legal and
accounting professionals involved with supercharged IPOs are
especially apt to operate as agents helping to spread ideas across
geographic areas, industries, and firm types.116 Indeed, various
scholars have found that network ties operate as an especially
important diffusion mechanism when the innovators are located in
close geographic proximity.117 We explore the network theory of
diffusion by examining the use of supercharged IPOs in the major
professional networks around the country, including New York,
Chicago, Boston, and Los Angeles. We uncover data that imply one
specific professional network is largely responsible for the bulk of
supercharged IPOs, thereby providing support for the network theory
of diffusion.118
3. Industry Culture
The architects of the supercharged IPO are lawyers and
accountants, but it is possible that certain types of clients will be more
likely than others to utilize innovative financial discoveries in an
effort to retain a competitive edge in their respective industries.119
Private equity and asset management firms, for example, are widely
viewed to be aggressive planners in both the tax and accounting
spheres. Indeed, qualitative data suggest that the innovation spiral
that occurred on the IPO landscape was engineered with the help of
116. See Jennifer Brown, The Spread of Aggressive Corporate Tax Reporting: A Detailed
Examination of the Corporate-Owned Life Insurance Shelter, 86 AcCT. REV. 23, 33 (2011)
(discussing diffusion of tax shelter activity).
117. Id.
118. See infra notes 136-59 and accompanying text.
119. Institutional and cultural constraints in general may also help explain why some
companies adopt innovative tax structures and some do not. While measuring the precise impact
of these factors is challenging, seasoned practitioners often point to variation in corporate culture
or managerial sophistication to explain how different clients react to new tax ideas. Some
academic research backs this common observation. When the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation
changed internal auditing controls-and reined in Enron-style corporate culture-the use of
corporate tax shelters declined significantly. Victor Fleischer, Options Backdating, Tax Shelters,
and Corporate Culture, 26 VA. TAX REV. 1031 (2006). Managerial sophistication matters, too:
private equity-backed companies tend to be more aggressive in their tax planning. See Sharon P.
Katz et al., The Impact of Private Equity Ownership on Portfolio Firms' Corporate Tax Planning




private equity firms seeking to enhance the benefits of the early
supercharged IPO.120 The principals of these firms often have
substantial experience structuring deals and for this reason have a
deep understanding of the stakes involved in the deal. Because of their
chosen line of work, private equity and hedge fund managers exhibit a
high level of tax sophistication. Thus, the theory of industry culture as
a diffusion mechanism leads to the hypothesis that, irrespective of
geography, private equity and asset management firms will be early
adopters of good innovations in the IPO context.121 We find that these
groups do affect the likelihood of supercharging an IPO, but not in the
positive way anticipated by the theory.122
4. Media Attention
Supercharged IPOs have received substantial attention in
popular journals, including the New York Times, the Wall Street
Journal, Forbes, and many others.123 At the same time, extensive
commentary on this innovative deal has appeared in specialized legal,
tax, and accounting outlets.124 This widespread attention and interest,
both positive and negative, educates firms, lawyers, and financial
intermediaries about the latest, most innovative deal structures and
raises awareness of an alternative to the traditional approach to going
public.125 Irrespective of whether the innovation is advantageous to all
the parties or solely to the company's owner-founders, the media
theory of diffusion leads to the hypothesis that as media attention
increases, so too does the use of the supercharged IPO, along with the
complex TRAs. We do not find empirical support for this hypothesis.
120. See, e.g., Johnston, supra note 10 (New York Times)
121. This prediction is analogous to predicting that when a cutting-edge oncologist is a
patient herself, she will tend to choose a more aggressive form of cancer treatment than the
average patient would choose. Melinda Beck, Checking Up on the Doctor: What Patients Can
Learn from the Ways Physicians Take Care of Themselves, http://perma.cc/GL2E-M89R (wsj.com,
archived Feb. 3, 2014).
122. See infra notes 136-59 and accompanying text.
123. See, e.g., Johnston, supra note 10 (New York Times); REUTERS, supra note 9 (Reuters);
Sloan, supra note 18 (Washington Post); Stammers, supra note 43 (Forbes).
124. Dance, supra note 105 (publication devoted to pass-through entities); Rosen & Furci,
supra note 17 (law firm publication); Elliot, supra note, at 8 (Tax Notes).
125. See Nancy C. Staudt, Taxpayers in Court: A Systematic Study of a (Misunderstood)
Standing Doctrine, 52 EMORY L.J. 771, 838-40 (2003) (arguing public attention to a legal issue
prompts lawyers and clients to follow suit).
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IV. THE EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION
Supercharged IPOs have emerged amidst controversy, but they
have also spread quickly across the financial landscape. In this
Section, we turn from the theoretical iterature to empirical data in an
effort to understand and explain why some parties choose to
supercharge their IPOs while others pursue conventional deal
structures. We begin in Part IV.A by describing our data and
explaining our models. In Part IV.B, we present our empirical results.
Part V investigates the implications of our findings both for the
parties involved in IPOs and for legal reformers.
A. The Data and the Models
This study investigates IPOs that took place between January
1, 2004, and May 1, 2011. We selected this time period because
supercharged IPOs were rare prior to 2007 but began to flourish after
that time. By including time periods both before and after 2007, we
are able to identify the factors that help to explain the supercharged
IPO's rise and diffusion. To identify the population of interest, we
obtained the registration statements under the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1933, also known as SEC Form S-1, for each new
securities offering.126 This process generated 1,326 IPOs between the
years 2004 and 2011. Only a small portion of these IPOs-just 2%-
were supercharged with a TRA. Figure 3 below depicts this
distribution. The gray bars indicate conventional IPOs, and the black
line at the bottom of the graphs depicts supercharged IPOs. Every
year between 2004 and 2011, owner-founders supercharged between
one and six IPOs, with the exception of 2007, when ten IPOs were
supercharged.
126. We identified all S-is from the Knowledge Mosaic database, http://perma.cclF9HU-
PURK (knowledgemosaic.com, archived Feb. 3, 2014). Because we are interested in initial public
offerings of equity securities where the investors implicitly price the assets and liabilities of the
issuer (including tax assets and liabilities), we excluded all debt offerings, secondary offerings,
SPACs, offerings that would trade on OTCBB, Pink Sheets, penny stock offerings ($1 or under),
401k plan offerings, and offerings of nonoperating companies (mutual funds, ETFs, commodity
pools). We are not interested in secondary offerings, private or PORTAL offerings, and do not
care whether the IPO was successful or not.
We searched each form S-1 for the specific terms: tax receivable agreement. This
approach excluded similar economic arrangements styled "tax matters agreements" or "tax
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Year of IPO
Note: Grey bars indicate the total number of traditional IPOs per year, and the
black trend line depicts the supercharged IPO adoption curve. Between 2004 and
2011, companies supercharged between one and ten IPOs per year.
1. Model 1
For purposes of investigating and comparing traditional and
supercharged IPOs, we devised three statistical models. The first
model explores the theories outlined above with respect to the rise of
the supercharged IPO, including tax and accounting regulations,
information asymmetry, transaction costs, and the business cycle. To
understand how we put our theory and hypotheses to work, consider
the following model:
(1) Pr(SuperIPO, = 1)
= be + bTaxArbitrage + b2Goodwilli + b3ExistingTaxAssets,
+ b4NeedlesslyComplexj + b5Macroeconomy, + XbC + e
where SuperIPOi n Equation 1 is the parties' decision to supercharge
the IPO with a TRA and is coded equal to one if the deal is
supercharged and equal to zero otherwise.127 As discussed above, our
first hypothesis relates to the parties' ability to take advantage of tax
and accounting rules. Because the tax rates imposed on many of the
127. We included all the IPOs with a TRA but took a random sample of all other IPOs. See




relevant parties were constant and unvarying between 2004 and
2011,128 we used a proxy to test our arbitrage theory. We know that
many IPOs involve individuals who sell partnership shares to Public
Co. and that this sale generates a 15% capital gains rate on
subsequent TRA payments but a 35% deduction rate for Public CO.129
Accordingly, we created TaxArbitragei, a variable that is equal to one
if Founders Co. is a partnership and equal to zero otherwise. Our
second hypothesis relates to the extent of the parties' ability to utilize
the advantageous tax and accounting rules vis-A-vis goodwill. This
ability will vary depending on the underlying value of the goodwill
asset at the time of the IPO, a number that we cannot directly
observe. As a proxy, we created the variable Goodwilli, which is a
continuous measure of Public Co.'s market value (based on post-IPO
trading) less the net book value of Founders Co. immediately prior to
the IPO, in $1 billion increments.130 If the IPO is structured as a
taxable deal, this amount will correlate closely with the amount of the
potential basis step-up attributable to goodwill, often the most
valuable asset in an IPO.
To test our information-asymmetry theory and the idea that
investors do not value tax assets due to an information deficit, we
created the variable ExistingTaxAssetsi, a continuous variable that
captures the value of Founders Co.'s net tax assets in $10 million
increments listed at the time of the IPO on the company's balance
sheets. A positive correlation between existing tax assets and the
decision to supercharge an IPO would lend support to the theory that
investors disregard tax assets when purchasing shares. Thus, owner-
founders would be right to extract this value with the help of a TRA.
In an effort to dig deeper into our theory of information asymmetry
and, specifically, owner-founders' misconduct, we created the variable
Needlessly Complexi, which is continuous and measures the number of
pages in ten-page increments in the IPO public filings. The hypothesis
is that as the number of pages increases, the temptation to include a
TRA will increase, on the theory that public investors will neither
observe nor understand the additional material imbedded in the deal.
128. See U.S. Federal Individual Income Tax Rates History, 1913-2013 (Nominal and
Inflation-Adjusted Brackets), http://perma.cc/6BN9-ULZS (taxfoundation.org, archived Feb. 3,
2013) (presenting data on rates over the course of time).
129. Id.
130. We gathered data from the CRSP database (Daily Stock File) where possible,
http://perma.cc/7RV8-XH7B (crsp.com, archived Feb. 3, 2014) and from the website YCharts for
firms where CRSP data was missing. See http://perma.cc/RF8S-T9EB (ycharts.com, archived
Feb. 3, 2014). Some firms in the sample withdrew their IPO offerings because of market
conditions or other reasons, so no measure of market value is available.
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We expect a preexisting complicated deal structure to enable owner-
founders to add a TRA without incurring market sanctions associated
with a decrease in the price paid for Public Co.'s shares.
Finally, one group of theorists argues that economic growth
will inspire financial innovation, but another argues that market
factors will have no effect at all. We test these theories with the help
of Macroeconomyi, a dichotomous variable that measures whether the
economy is growing or shrinking, as measured by the National Bureau
of Economic Research ("NBER").131 Finding a positive correlation
between upswings in the economy and the supercharged IPOs would
support the first group of theorists, while a null finding would support
the second group.
Our hypotheses forecast a positive correlation between the first
three variables (TaxArbitragei, Goodwilli, and ExistingTaxAssetsi) of
Model 1 and the use of supercharged IPOs; thus, we expect that the
coefficients on those variables will be positive (bi, b2, and b > 0). If the
coefficients on these variables are not positive, then these factors do
not play the expected role in the parties' decision to adopt this deal
structure. Indeed, if these coefficients are equal to zero or negative (bi,
b2, and b 5 0), the evidence favors the critics' interpretation of these
deals: owner-founders are not motivated by a desire to reduce taxes
and save investors' money, but perhaps by the desire to extract large
sums from Public Co. irrespective of the effect on investors. If bad
behavior is present, we expect the coefficient on Needlessly Complexi to
be positive (b > 0). If that coefficient is negative (b4 < 0), then complex
deals discourage the use of the TRAs, perhaps out of fear of market
punishment or perceived improprieties-a finding that would
undermine the claim that owner-founders are acting in an
underhanded fashion. We expect the coefficient on Macroeconomyi to
be positive (b5 > 0) if, as theories have argued, a growing economy
generates financial innovation. If the coefficient on Macroeconomyi is
negative (b5 < 0), a contracting economy generates innovation, and if it
is equal to zero (b5 = 0), macroeconomic factors have no effect on the
parties' behavior.
131. The NBER business-cycle dating committee publishes information with respect the
macroeconomy and identifies whether the nation is in a period of growth or contractions. The
data is widely available on the internet. See U.S. Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions,
http://perma.cc/8KHZ-QV6Y (nber.org, archived Feb. 3, 2014).
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Model 1 identifies our strategy for understanding the general
incentives for supercharging an IPO. Extant theory, however, also
provides an intuition for how and why successful innovations diffuse
across industries and geographic zones. Notwithstanding the
drawbacks associated with complexity and bad press, Robert Willens
has noted that supercharged IPOs, along with the attendant TRAs,
have become "almost standard procedure in these types of
incorporations."132 To investigate this diffusion process, we rely on two
additional models. Model 2 is specified as follows:
(2) Pr(SuperPO = 1)
= bo + b1EliteLawyers, + b2EliteAccountantsj + b3NetworkBoston
+ b4NetworkNYC + b5NetworkChicagoj + b6NetworkBayAreaj
+ b7NetworkLA + bsPrivateEquity + b9Media + Ib1Cij + e
where SuperIPOi n Equation 2 is the parties' decision to supercharge
the IPO with a TRA and is coded equal to one if the deal is
supercharged and equal to zero otherwise. Our first theory of diffusion
relates to the use of elite lawyers and accountants, individuals who
are likely to create, track, and use the most up-to-date and innovative
deal structures. To test this theory, we rely on EliteLawyeri and
EliteAccountanti, dichotomous variables coded equal to one if the
lawyer or accountant on the deal is from an elite firm and equal to
zero otherwise.133 Our second theory relates to legal networks: we
132. Willens, supra note 60, at 1.
133. We used the firm Chambers and Partners' methodology to identify the law firms in the
first tier: Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton, Davis Polk & Wardwell, Skadden, Arps, Slate,
Meagher & Flom, Sullivan & Cromwell, and Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz.
See http://perma.cclH2JT-E4QW (chambersandpartners.com, archived Feb. 3, 2014). The top law
firms in the second tier, using this same methodology, include: Cravath, Swaine & Moore,
Debevoise & Plimpton, Kirkland & Ellis, Latham & Watkins, Simpson Thacher & Bartlett, and
Weil, Gotshal & Manges. Id.
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expect corporations that hire lawyers and consultants from shared
professional networks to be more likely to discover innovative ideas
and to put those ideas to work. We test this theory with the help of a
group of variables indicating whether the lawyers on the deal were
located in Boston, New York City, Chicago, the Bay Area, or Los
Angeles-the five most popular metropolitan areas for firms doing
IPO work. The variables NetworkBostoni, NetworkNYCi,
Network Chicagoi, NetworkBayAreai, and NetworkLAi are all coded
equal to one if the firm is from that city and equal to zero otherwise.
Our third theory of diffusion posits that industry culture
fosters the dissemination of innovative financial strategies. Private
equity firms and hedge funds are widely believed to be particularly
innovative and likely to be early adopters of creative financing plans.
We test this theory with PrivateEquityi, a dichotomous variable that is
equal to one if the firm is a private equity firm (not including venture
capital firms) or if the issuer was backed by a private equity firm, and
equal to zero otherwise.
Finally, we investigate our fourth theory, which posits that
media attention will promote the use and diffusion of supercharged
IPOs. We test this hypothesis with the variable Mediai, a continuous
variable that measures the extent of media coverage in national
journals (both popular and those geared to tax, accounting, and
banking audiences) with respect to supercharged IPOs. In sum, we
expect a positive correlation between supercharged IPOs and all the
variables in Model 2 (b1 through b9 > 0).












The Big Four Accounting Firms include: (1) Deloitte, (2) KPMG, (3) Ernst & Young, and (4)
PricewaterhouseCoopers. See The Big Four Accounting Firms, http://perma.cc/manage/create




Model 3 also investigates the diffusion process but seeks to
identify the "first movers."
(3) DateSuperIPOi = be + b1EliteLawyersl + b2ElteAccountantsi + b3NetworkBostoni
+ b4NetworkNYC + bsNetworkChicagoi + b6NetworkBayAreat
+ b7NetworkLA + bsPrivateEquityi+ Ib1Cj + e
Our dependent variable in Model 3 is the date on which a company
filed an S-1 statement with the SEC.134 The eight independent
variables are identical to those outlined in Model 2,135 and we expect a
positive correlation between the date of the supercharged IPO and all
the variables in model (b1 through b8 > 0). In short, we hypothesize
that early movers will be firms that (1) use elite lawyers and
accountants, (2) are in key professional networks, and (3) have
ambitious firm cultures and organizations.
In addition to the explanatory variables just described in
Models 1, 2, and 3, we have a control set in each model, which includes
whether Founders Co. was incorporated in Delaware
(StateIncorpDel), Founders Co.'s market capitalization in $1 billion
increments (MarketCap), and a time trend indicating, when relevant,
the filing date of the first S-1. These variables ensure that our models
account for unexpected or unobservable factors associated with the
choice to incorporate domestically or in a tax haven
(StateIncorpHaven), the company's value at the time of the IPO, and
the time period of the filing. Finally, we weighted our data to account
for the fact that we used a unique sampling frame for purposes of
collecting data. We included every supercharged IPO that took place
on the market into our dataset but took a random sample of the
traditional IPOs. By weighting the data to account for the different
probabilities of selection, we improve our chances of producing
unbiased estimates.
134. We coded the variable "date" as the day, month, and year that the S-1 Form was filed.
Because STATA stores dates as integers, early dates in the data base have a lower number than
later dates. In order to easily interpret our linear regression model, we converted the positive
integers into negative integers. Accordingly, we will interpret the regression coefficients in Model
3 in the following way: a positive coefficient indicates the lawyer, firm, network, etc. is associated
with an early adoption of the TRA.
135. We excluded media coverage in our third model on the grounds that this coverage would
not be expected to explain the first-mover status. The media coverage began three years after the
early movers began supercharging their IPOs.
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B. Competing Theories of Supercharged IPOs: The Empirical Results
We now turn to our empirical findings. Our dependent variable
in Models 1 and 2 is the presence of a supercharged IPO. As explained
above, this is a binary variable, and thus, we use probit models for
purposes of estimation.36 Probit coefficients are difficult to
interpret,37 so we present our results with respect to Models 1 and 2
in an alternative and easy to comprehend form: the tables below
depict the likelihood that the parties will supercharge their IPO given
a unit increase in the independent variable.38 Recall that we
explained our coding protocols for each variable above-this is
136. Probit models are necessary because the dependent variable is binary. A large literature
discusses the advantages of using a probit (or a logit) model over a linear probability model with
a binary dependent variable. See, e.g., PETER KENNEDY, A GUIDE TO ECONOMETRICS 259-61 (5th
ed. 2003) (using a linear probability model and producing estimated probabilities outside the
zero to one range); J. SCOTT LONG, REGRESSION MODELS FOR CATEGORICAL AND LIMITED
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 34-84 (1997) (using a linear probability model with a binary dependent
variable necessarily violates many of the underlying assumptions of the former, including those
associated with heteroskedasticity, normality, and functional form). See generally DAVID
COLLETT, MODELING BINARY DATA 54-55, 92-93 (2d ed. 2003).
137. See WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 126, at 588 ("[F]rom a practical perspective the most
difficult aspect of logit or probit models is presenting and interpreting the results."); see also
JACK JOHNSTON & JOHN DINARDO, ECONOMETRIC METHODS 422 (1997) (noting that probit
coefficients are difficult to interpret and arguing that "it is not generally useful merely to report
the coefficients from a probit [as it is for a linear probability model] unless only the sign and
significance are of interest"); LONG, supra note 135, at 61-83 (discussing four interpretive
approaches).
138. We generated these probability estimates by transforming the probit coefficients with
the "dprobit" command in STATA. See 2 STATA CORP., STATA BASE REFERENCE MANUAL, at
475-77 (2005) (discussing dprobit as a useful means for transforming probit coefficients into
easily interpreted probabilities). The marginal effects are calculated for each variable, holding all
other variables at their mean. The original probit models have an intercept, but we use "dprobit"
and thus do not report marginal effects for the intercept on the theory that this would make no
sense given all the variables are held at the mean with the "dprobit" command.
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important information if our results are to be interpreted correctly.139
For example, a positive sign on a coefficient presented in the tables
below would indicate that as the independent variable increases
(moves from zero to one if it is binary),140 the parties are more likely to
supercharge the IPO; a negative sign indicates that the parties are
less likely to supercharge the deal as the independent variable
increases. In Model 3, we use a continuous dependent variable-the
date a company files an S-1 indicating a supercharged IPO is
planned-and consequently, we use a linear regression model.'4'
These coefficients are directly interpretable: a positive coefficient
indicates that as the independent variable increases, the earlier the
date of an S-1 filing with a TRA; a negative coefficient indicates that
as the independent variable increases, the later the date of an early
S-1 filing.
1. The Rise of the Supercharged IPO
To begin our investigation, we focus on Model 1, which presents
the competing models for the rise of the supercharged IPO outlined
above. Recall that Model 1 seeks to identify the factors that theorists
have identified for innovation generally-tax and accounting rules,
information asymmetry, transaction costs, and the macroeconomy. We
investigate these factors in an effort to identify how they affect IPOs
and the choice to supercharge the deal. Table 4 immediately below
presents our results; the third and fourth columns indicate different
specifications of Model 1.
139. See supra notes 127-35 and accompanying text.
140. For example, we coded the variable TaxArbitrage equal to one if the parties are subject
to differential tax rates, and zero otherwise. If the coefficient on the TaxArbitrage variable is
positive (negative) then the possibility of tax arbitrage makes it more (less) likely that the deal
will be supercharged with a TRA. See supra notes 127-31.
141. See WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 126, at 400.
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Table 4: Competing Theories of Innovation
Theories Variables Model I Model 1
(Specification A) (Specification B)
Regulatory Arbitrage TaxArbitrage .10 (.03)*** .10 (.03)***
Goodwill -.0009 (.007)* .007 (.002)
TaxArbitrage x Goodwill -.002 (.002)
Information Asymmetry: ExistingTaxAssets .00006 (.00005) .00005 (.00006)
Investor Info Deficit
Information Asymmetry: NeedlesslyComplex .0001 (.0002) .0002 (.0002)
Founders' Opportunism
Macroeconomy Macroeconomy -.015 (.01)** -.016 (.011)**
Control Set MarketCap .002 (.001)** .0009 (.002)
StateIncorpDel .004 (.003)** .004 (.003)**
StatelncorpHaven .006 (.01) .006 (.01)
Time Trend .001 (.0007) .001 (.0007)
Observations 315 315
Pseudo r 2  .40 .40
Note: The results depict the likelihood of a supercharged IPO given one unit
increase in the independent variable. We used dprobit to generate the findings
presented in Table 1 in STATA. *** indicates the findings are statistically
significant at the .01 level, ** indicates statistical significance at the .05 level,
and * indicates significance at the .10 level. 142
Our first theory posits that tax and accounting regulations will
affect the choice to innovate in the IPO context. To test this theory, we
focus first on tax-arbitrage opportunities; this emerges when the
owner-founders are taxed at a 15% rate and Public Co. is taxed at a
35% percent rate.143 As presented in Table 4, Specification A, we find
that when the parties have tax-arbitrage opportunities, they are ten
percentage points more likely to adopt a supercharged IPO. This
finding is highly statistically significant, suggesting that when
partnerships are present and tax-arbitrage opportunities exist, the
142. To replicate our findings in STATA, contact us for the dataset (our contact information
is in the acknowledgment footnotes on the Article's first page) and use the following code for
Model 1, Column A: probit TRA partnership GoodwillBill net taxasstenmill pages_10 cycle
MarketCap.bill StatelncorpDel StateIncorp Haven y [pweight=weight].
For Model 1, Column B, use the following STATA code: xi: dprobit TIRA
i.partnership*Goodwill_ Bill nettaxass tenmill pages_10 cycle MarketCap-bill StateIncorpDel
StatelncorpHaven y [pweight=weight].
143. See supra notes 127-31 and accompanying text for a discussion regarding tax rates and
coding protocols.
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parties have a strong motivation to supercharge their IPO.144 This
empirical finding is consistent with our theoretical discussion above,
which suggested that the parties would agree to a supercharged IPO
in the context of differential rates but not when the parties were taxed
at the same rate, in light of the expected overall net loss in the latter
deals.145 We discuss the details of why this is true in the Appendix.
We also examined the presence of goodwill, which, as discussed
above, allows the parties to take advantage of the variance in the tax
and accounting rules.146 Our findings surprisingly show a negative
correlation: as Founders Co.'s goodwill increases, the likelihood of
supercharging the IPO decreases. More specifically, for every
$1 billion increase in goodwill, the parties are 0.09% less likely to
adopt the innovative IPO structure at statistically significant levels.
The size of this coefficient, however, is miniscule, implying that
goodwill is having close to zero effect on deal structures.147
To investigate in more detail the twin findings with respect to
tax and accounting, we created an interaction term: a term that
identifies how two variables interact together in affecting the parties'
choices. Models with interaction terms are more complex to
interpret.148 The variable TaxArbitrage in Table 4, Specification B now
indicates how tax rates affect the parties when Founders Co. has no
goodwill, and the variable Goodwill indicates the role of goodwill in
the absence of tax-arbitrage opportunities. The interaction term,
TaxArbitrage x Goodwill, reflects the marginal impact of goodwill on
the likelihood of supercharging an IPO when the opportunity for tax
arbitrage is present. The finding with respect to tax arbitrage in
Table 4, Specification B indicates that the parties continue to be
144. For a useful discussion of statistical significance and its interpretation for empirical
results, see WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 126, at 133-38.
145. See supra notes 82-91 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 82-91 and accompanying text.
147. For example, People's United Financial, Inc. went public in late 2006 with over
$6 billion in goodwill, meaning the probability that the company would supercharge the IPO
decreased by 0.6%-less than 1%. People's United Fin., Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1)
(Nov. 2, 2006), available at http://www.nasdaq.com/markets/spos/filing.ashx?filingid=4480665.
We also created an indicator variable with goodwill coded equal to one for companies with
goodwill over $500 million and equal to zero otherwise. The sign of the coefficient in this model
changed from negative to positive, but still did not achieve statistical significance.
148. See Edward C. Norton, Hua Wang & Chunrong Ai, Computing Interaction Effects and
Standard Errors in Logit and Probit Models, 4 STATA J. 154, 154-67 (2004) (arguing that most
applied researchers misinterpret the coefficients on interaction terms and proposing useful
interpretive procedures); see also William Greene, Testing Hypotheses About Interaction Terms in
Nonlinear Models, 107 EcoN. LETrERS 291, 291, 295 (2010) (arguing that graphical
presentations are the most effective means for presenting the results).
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ten percentage points more likely to supercharge their IPO even when
they have no goodwill. The consistency of the results with respect to
tax arbitrage across models trongly suggests that they are robust and
that tax motives are playing a major role in the choice to innovate.
With respect to goodwill alone, we find the coefficient changes from
negative to positive but is not statistically significant, suggesting that
goodwill alone is not playing a strong role in the parties' IPO
planning-a result that is also robust across different model
specifications.149 Now consider how tax arbitrage and goodwill interact
when simultaneously present. Table 4, Specification B indicates that
the parties are less likely to supercharge the deal in these
circumstances, but not at statistically significant levels. In short, our
models suggest that tax arbitrage, and not the book-tax differences
associated with goodwill, is the primary motivator for supercharging
an IPO. Our theoretical and quantitative analyses suggest this
conclusion, and the raw data supports it: 44% of all the parties capable
of engaging in tax arbitrage executed a TRA, while only 1% of the
parties who had no arbitrage opportunities but had goodwill present
adopted a TRA.
Figure 4 below presents our findings with respect to tax
arbitrage in visual form. Our model predicts that, holding all other
variables constant, firms with tax-arbitrage opportunities have, on
average, a 25% likelihood of supercharging their IPO, whereas firms
without this capability have a 0.04% likelihood of adopting this
innovative deal structure. Figure 4 below depicts the firms'
probabilities of supercharging their IPO over the course of years. It is
easy to see that those with tax-arbitrage opportunities are more likely
to supercharge in every year of our data.16 0
149. See supra note 147 exploring the effects of goodwill using an indicator variable.
150. We generated these graphs with the help of the "graph twoway lowess" syntax in
STATA. See STATA, GRAPHICS REFERENCE MANUAL 217-19 (9th ed. 2005).
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Figure 4: Predicted Probability that Firms With and Without









No tax arbitrage opportunity
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Note: The figure depicts the probability of a supercharged IPO on the y-axis and the
year of the IPO on the x-axis. The graph presents the predicted probability of a
supercharged IPO using a locally weighted scatterplot-smoothing (Lowess) curve.
We now consider the information-asymmetry theory of
innovation. Our model, presented in Table 4, Specifications A and B
above, indicates that this theory has no role in the choice to
supercharge an IPO. First, we find that for every $1 million of tax
assets, the parties are 0.006% more likely to execute a TRA. Not only
is this size of the coefficient virtually zero, but the finding is not
statistically significant.15 1 This suggests that owner-founders do not
use tax assets as a justification for extracting funds in the post-IPO
period on the grounds that investors naively ignore the value of these
assets. Moreover, our results indicate that owner-founders are not
slipping TRAs into complex IPO documents for opportunistic reasons,
as suggested by our finding on the variable NeedlesslyComplex. Table
4, Specifications A and B indicate that as the S-1 filing increases by
ten pages, the parties have a 0.01% increase in the likelihood of
supercharging the IPO, a finding that is both very small substantively
and not statistically significant. The null findings that emerge in both
specifications of the models with respect to information asymmetry
imply that this factor does not affect IPOs, as we theorized above.
151. For a useful discussion of statistical significance and its interpretation for empirical
results, see WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 126, at 133-38.
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The transaction-cost heory of IPOs can be assessed indirectly
with the series of findings just discussed vis-A-vis tax and accounting
regulations and information asymmetry. As we noted above, theorists
have argued that TRAs eliminate transaction costs in certain
circumstances-they remove the need to negotiate the value of tax
assets and enable the parties to reach an agreed-upon up-front price.
Our models suggest that this is only true when tax arbitrage is
present; goodwill standing alone is not sufficient reason to
supercharge an IPO and will not produce benefits that exceed costs.
Moreover, our models suggest that Founders Co. is not using
the supercharged IPO as a means to ensure investors pay for tax
assets, nor is it slipping TRAs into the IPO in order to surreptitiously
extract money from Public Co. Owner-founders, therefore, are not
acting opportunistically, contrary to what many have argued.152 This
finding implies that the costs of adopting these strategies exceed their
benefits when tax arbitrage is not a possibility. Our models, in short,
support the idea that TRAs may eliminate transaction costs when tax
arbitrage exists but are likely to exacerbate costs in other contexts and
thus are not worth the effort or the bad press.153
Finally, the macroeconomic theory of innovation posits two
hypotheses: financial experts will innovate with a growing economy,
or, alternatively, experts will innovate in all periods as a means to
maintain a competitive edge. Our findings challenge the extant
theoretical literature. We find that as the economy becomes stronger,
the parties are less likely to supercharge their IPOs. Both
Specifications A and B in Table 4 indicate that, in a growing economy,
the probability of a supercharged IPO decreases by sixteen percentage
points, and this finding is statistically significant. Although the
finding challenges existing theory, it is not altogether surprising in
this context. The value of tax assets are linked to the companies'
future profits, which are less certain in periods of economic decline.
For this reason, a new Public Co. (and its investors) would be less
willing to pay for those assets up front and would prefer to execute a
TRA. Figure 5 depicts the likelihood of a supercharged IPO in periods
of economic growth and decline. The gray areas represent growth, and
the white area represents the "Great Recession" that took place from
late 2007 to early 2009.154 The black trend line indicates the
152. See supra notes 11-20 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 82-91 and accompanying text.
154. The precise start and stop dates of U.S. economic growth and decline is published by the
National Bureau of Economic Research. NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, BUSINESS CYCLE
EXPANSIONS AND CONTRACTIONS, http://perma.cc/4HQ2-R7XC (nber.org, archived Feb. 3, 2014).
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probability of a supercharged IPO. It is easy to see that the
probabilities increase in the recessionary period and decrease in
periods of economic growth, though the differential is substantively
small. At statistically significant levels, the parties have a 4%
likelihood of supercharging their IPO in periods of economic growth
and a 7% likelihood of supercharging in periods of economic decline.




2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Note: The gray and white areas indicate periods of economic growth and stagnation,
respectively, as determined by the NBER dating committee. The graph presents the
predicted probability of a supercharged IPO using a locally weighted scatterplot-
smoothing (Lowess) curve. As indicated in the figure, supercharged IPOs are 3%
more likely to occur in periods of recession.
At last, we turn to our control set. We find that companies
organized in Delaware are more likely to innovate than those
organized elsewhere, including in tax havens. Because Delaware is
widely viewed as an agreeable place for companies to incorporate for
legal reasons, it is not surprising that sophisticated companies choose
this state over others.155 Notably, TRAs are not associated with tax
havens, implying that owner-founders are willing to push the
boundaries of their tax planning, but only so far. As we will see below,
however, firms organized in tax havens appear to be the early movers
155. Lucian Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms'Decisions Where to Incorporate, 46 J.L. & ECON.
383 (2003) (investigating why and where firms incorporate and arguing that Delaware's
dominance can be expected to increase in the future).
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when it comes to adopting the supercharged IPO deal structure.15 6 A
firm's market capitalization has no effect on the choice to supercharge,
and our time trend suggests that TRAs have gotten more popular in
recent periods, but not at statistically significant levels.
2. The Early Adopters and the Proliferation of the Supercharged IPO
We now turn to the factors that explain the use and
proliferation of supercharged IPOs. We begin first with Model 2, which
identifies the parties most likely to adopt the innovative IPO, and
then turn to Model 3, which explores the "first movers." Table 5
presents our findings. The coefficients should all be interpreted as
above: a positive coefficient indicates that as the independent
variables increase, the likelihood of a supercharged IPO increases
(Model 2) or the date on which an entity in the dataset files an S-1
Form with a TRA provision is relatively early (Model 3); a negative
coefficient indicates that as the independent variables increase, these
probabilities decrease or the company's S-1 filing date becomes
relatively later.15 7
With respect to Model 2 and general innovation trends, we
present our findings in Table 5. Our first theory posits that lawyers
will have an impact on deal structures, and we find that elite lawyers
increase the likelihood of supercharging an IPO at statistically
significant levels, but only by 1.4 percentage points. Accountants at
the Big Four firms have an even smaller effect; they increase the
likelihood of a supercharged IPO by 0.5 percentage points, and this
finding is not statistically significant. Our second theory posits that,
irrespective of the elite nature of the legal or accounting advice,
professional networks will have the strongest role to play. Our
findings support this theory, although again, the effect is small: we
find that IPO-utilizing firms that hire New York lawyers are two
percentage points more likely to supercharge their deals than firms
anywhere else. Our models indicate that the firm networks located in
Los Angeles, Chicago, and the Bay Area have little to no effect on deal
structure. It is worthwhile to note that the raw data, which must
always be taken with a grain of salt given the lack of controls,
supports this finding: New York City law firms were involved in 74%
of the supercharged IPOs. The remaining supercharged deals were
156. See infra note 158 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 132-35 and accompanying text (explaining interpretation of the
variables in the models).
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sprinkled across various markets, with no market coming in as a close
competitor to New York City.
We also theorized that the type of investors sponsoring the IPO
would affect the choice to supercharge. Our model indicates that
private equity-backed firms are two percentage points less likely to
supercharge their IPOs, at statistically significant levels. We expected
the opposite result given the ambitious and aggressive nature of these
types of sponsors, but we were wrong. Finally, we expected that the
media frenzy would have a positive effect on the parties' choice to
supercharge the deal. While we do uncover a positive coefficient, it is
very small, and the finding is not statistically significant. Our results
indicate that elite law firms and firms located in New York City have
the greatest effect on deal structure, not the firm's culture or media
coverage of the deal's innovative nature.
With respect to the control set, we find that firms with large
market capitalizations and those organized in tax havens have little or
no effect on the choice to supercharge the IPO. Firms organized in
Delaware, however, have an increased likelihood of innovating in the
IPO context by one percentage point at statistically significant levels.
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Table 5: Competing Theories of Use and Diffusion
Theories Variables Model 2: Model 3: Speed of
Adoption Any Time Adoption, Conditional
on Adoption
Elite Firms EliteLawyer .014 (.009)* .91 (.71)
EliteAccountant .005 (.003) 1.14 (.96)
Prof l Networks NetworkBoston No supercharged IPOs No supercharged IPOs
NetworkNYC .02 (.1)*** -.31 (.87)
NetworkChicago -.0006 (.01) -2.01 (.74)***
NetworkLA No supercharged IPOs No supercharged IPOs
NetworkBayArea .0001 (.008) -3.32 (1.85)***
Firm Culture PrivateEquity -.02 (.008)*** -.56 (.73)
Media Frenzy Media -.006 (.00)
Control Set MarketCap .00004 (.0003) -.00004 (.0002)
StatelncorpDel .01 (.005)** 2.42 (.99)**
StatelncorpHaven .02 (.03) 4.49 (1.50)***
Time Trend .004 (.003)**
Observations 324 33
Pseudo r2  .24 .48
Note: The results depict the likelihood of a supercharged IPO given one unit
increase in the independent variable. We used dprobit in STATA to generate the
findings presented in Table 2, Column 3. *** indicates the findings are statistically
significant at the .01 level, ** indicates statistical significance at the .05 level, and *
indicates significance at the .10 level.15 8
We now turn to Model 3 and seek to identify the first movers in
the supercharged-IPO context. The extant literature argues that first
movers tend to be aggressive firm owners who do not shirk from risk
and who enjoy the prestige and attention of first-mover status.159 This
would suggest that private equity-backed firms would be early
adopters of the supercharged IPO. Those organized in tax havens may
158. To replicate our models, contact us for the data (our contact information is in the
acknowledgment footnotes on the Article's first page) and use the following code for Model 2:
dprobit TRA eliteissuecounsel AccountingBig4 CityIssuerLawNYC CityIssuerLawChicago
City jssuerLawBayArea sponsor._VCPE Media_2007 MarketCap StateIncorpDel
Statelncorp.Haven y [pweight=weight].
For Model 3 use the following code: reg neg_ month_.year elite -issue-counsel
Accounting.Big4 CityIssuerLaw_NYC CityIssuerLawChicago CityIssuerLaw_BayArea
sponsor_VCPE MarketCap StateIncorp.Del Statelncorp.Haven [pweight=weight] if TRA=1.
159. Andrew Metrick & Ayako Yasuda, Venture Capital and Other Private Equity: A Survey,
17 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 619 (2011) (discussing how venture capitalists invest in innovative firms and
push for first-mover status); Ravi Ramamurti, New Players in FDI: Sovereign Wealth Funds,
Private Equity, and Emerging-Market Multinationals, in THE FUTURE OF SOVEREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT AND THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 137 (Ravi Ramamurti & Niron Hashai eds.,
2011) (stating that hedge funds and private equity firms are aggressive first movers on the global
stage).
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also be early adopters. As presented in Table 5, we find that
private equity-backed firms were not the early movers. These firms
adopted the supercharged deal structure, but only after other firms
tried and tested it. Moreover, elite lawyers and accountants did not
take the lead in supercharging IPOs, nor did the professional
networks that we identified in Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, New
York, and the Bay Area. Indeed, these firms were all less likely to
supercharge a deal early.
The variables that have the strongest ability to predict early
mover status are found in our control set. Firms organized in
Delaware have an increased likelihood of supercharging their IPO
early, but it is the firms located in a tax haven that are the most likely
to be the first movers. This latter finding is consistent with the extant
literature in the sense that it predicts that aggressive and risk-taking
firms will be the most likely to adopt a new-and untested-
innovative financial plan. Once tested by the market, other firms will
follow.
C. Summary
We specified three models for purposes of understanding the
rise, use, and diffusion of supercharged IPOs. With respect to the
underlying justification for adopting the supercharged deal structure,
we found that the primary motivator was the ability to engage in tax
arbitrage and that a shrinking economy was a secondary motivator.
Our data suggest that owner-founders do not supercharge their deals
out of a belief that investors do not understand the value of tax assets
or in an effort to opportunistically squeeze profits out of the new
public company. Perhaps these last two justifications, widely
discussed in the literature, are simply not worth the cost associated
with the more complex deal and the bad press.
Our findings with respect to the use and diffusion of
supercharged IPOs indicate that owner-founders going public are
likely to be organized in Delaware and, at the same time, are likely to
hire elite lawyers, most likely from the New York City region. We also
investigated the identity of the first movers and found that the
variable exerting the largest effect is the location where the firm going
public is organized. Firms organized in tax havens are the most likely




V. IMPLICATIONS OF EMPIRICAL FINDINGS FOR PARTIES AND LEGAL
REFORMERS
Our study has a number of important implications for
transactional lawyers, policy reformers, and scholars interested in
financial innovation more generally. We begin by reminding readers
that the transactional awyers involved in supercharging IPOs do so in
an effort to reduce the parties' overall tax costs-a result that causes
harm to the federal fisc and has prompted legal reformers to propose
new legislation. In short, the success of the former group makes the
work of the latter group more challenging. After discussing the
implications of our findings for lawyers and policy analysts, we turn to
the scholarly literature and note that our project builds upon and
extends a large body of work focused on financial innovation.
A. Implications for Transactional Lawyers
1. Dividing the Costs and Benefits of the Supercharged IPO
We have investigated the differences between traditional and
supercharged IPOs, the myriad reasons for why supercharged IPOs
entered the market, and the explanations for why they diffused across
geographic areas and industries. We have not yet addressed a key
pending question, however: who wins and who loses in these
innovative deals? Shedding light on this issue will enable owner-
founders and public investors to enter deals that most advance their
respective economic interests and, perhaps more importantly, avoid
deal structures that undermine their welfare.
The parties jointly profit from the deals if and only if (1) new
"tax assets"160 are created in the deal, (2) the operating company is
organized as a partnership pre-IPO,161 and (3) IPO pricing does not
perfectly adjust to the presence or absence of tax assets. New tax
assets are critical because the transaction costs associated with a TRA
are higher than a deal without a TRA-slicing a pie with a fancy and
innovative knife does not make more pie! So there must be some new
value that makes a supercharged IPO efficient. Second, there must be
some opportunity for tax arbitrage; most commonly, this means that
the operating company must be organized as a partnership pre-IPO.162
160. See supra notes 34-43 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 61-63, 82-91, 143-45, and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text. If the company is organized as a
corporation, then it must have an net operating loss ("NOL") or some other tax attribute that
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Finally, the sharing of tax benefits via the TRA must be necessary to
capture the value of the new structure; if IPO pricing were perfect,
and the new investors agreed to pay for all the underlying tax assets,
the founders could simply supercharge the deal and accept a higher
purchase price in lieu of a TRA, leaving the full value of the tax assets
with the newly public company. We note in the Appendix that the
supercharged IPO's benefits, when they exist, are nearly equally
divided between the parties (the investors and Public Co. obtain
slightly more than the owner-founders).
2. Regulatory Costs, Not Transaction Costs, Drive Innovation
Traditionally, deal lawyers have been perceived as transaction-
cost engineers: adding value by reducing information costs, reining in
agency costs, and aligning incentives between the parties.163 But our
empirical findings, along with the explanation of profit sharing,
together suggest that tax lawyers may be driving the innovation in
deal structure. More interestingly, perhaps, is the implication that you
get what you pay for: our data show that firms were more likely to
engage in tax arbitrage when they employed elite New York tax
counsel.164 Theoretically, of course, it is also possible that the clients
were behind the supercharged IPO and that more aggressive clients
engaged elite tax counsel to execute more aggressive transactions. Our
empirical findings regarding elite counsel, however, remain significant
after controlling for private equity-backed issuers and other types of
aggressive financial engineers.165 The supercharged IPO is best
understood, therefore, as a method of moving tax dollars from the
government to the selling owners' pockets. The accompanying TRAs
appear to be a mostly benign means of delivering this arbitrage-driven
benefit (i.e., one that may not harm shareholders).
3. Why Corporations?
Our empirical results show that tax arbitrage is the key means
by which firms are able to achieve large tax savings in the IPO
context. Firms that are going public and are organized as partnerships
allows it to avoid entity-level gains on the transfer of assets to the new company. See Willens,
supra note 60, at 1.
163. See SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 34, at 20 (explaining the purpose of deal lawyers);
SCHULTHEIS ET AL., supra note 34, at 10 (same).
164. See supra notes 158-59 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 158-59 and accompanying text.
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position themselves to take advantage of this opportunity and, indeed,
are vastly more likely to use a supercharged IPO than firms organized
as corporations. The tax arbitrage created when founders sell equity
at capital gains rates while generating a tax asset that can be
amortized at ordinary rates is, according to our study, the key driver
of this innovation.166 This finding adds to the puzzle of why so many
firms organize as corporations rather than partnerships.167 Organizing
a start-up as a corporation often leaves literally millions of dollars on
the table. Savvy tax counsel continue to advise more firms to organize
as partnerships, and the availability of exiting by way of a
supercharged IPO may entice more founders to choose the partnership
form. At the same time, the possibility of a supercharged IPO does not
change the frictions that steer many founders toward incorporation in
the first place,168 and it is unclear whether unsophisticated founders
will be willing to further complicate the organization of their start-
ups.
B. Policy Implications
Our study demonstrates that with the help of a supercharged
IPO, companies, their founders, and investors all stand to save
millions of dollars in taxes. This suggests that while these innovative
deals are rational from a planning perspective, they are also
enormously costly to the public fisc. Put differently, a small group of
private and public investors have found a means to avoid tax costs to
the detriment of the larger tax-paying public. Policymakers who worry
about the tax base as well as the progressive rate structure have not
overlooked this reality. Indeed, in 2009, in the wake of the highly
controversial Blackstone supercharged IPO that involved millions of
dollars of post-IPO payments pursuant to a TRA, 69 Congress
166. See supra notes 61-63, 82-91, 143-45 and accompanying text.
167. CARL wARREN, SURVEY OF ACCOUNTING 3-4 (2010) (stating that roughly 20% of
businesses continue to organize as corporations).
168. For a discussion of frictions in the tax context, see generally Schizer, supra note 25.
169. When Blackstone, a well-known private equity firm, went public in 2007 in a high-
profile IPO, Congress focused for the first time on the controversial tax treatment of the profits
Blackstone earns for managing its funds, which is known as "carried interest." Media attention
increased when Stephen Schwarzman, Blackstone's cofounder and CEO, threw himself a lavish
birthday party; Schwarzman's largesse invited questions about the favorable tax treatment of
not only carried interest, but also about the aggressive structure of Blackstone's IPO, which
allows the firm to avoid paying corporate-level income taxes. Blackstone's tax creativity went
even further. Blackstone's founders entered into a contract, called a "Tax Receivable Agreement,"
with the public holding company they created. See Johnston, supra note 10; see also Patrick
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introduced legislation that targeted the tax arbitrage driving these
types of supercharged deals.170 The goal of the legislation was to
eliminate the rate disparity that currently exists between
partnerships and corporations, thereby eliminating the arbitrage
opportunities in supercharged IPOs.171 More specifically, under
current law, gain on the sale of property is generally taxed at
ordinary-income rates if the transferred property is subject to
depreciation or amortization in the hands of the purchaser.172 In this
circumstance, there is no arbitrage opportunity. Gain on the sale of a
partnership interest, however, is taxed at capital gains rates except to
the extent that the value is attributed to so-called hot assets, like
inventory and unrealized receivables-the types of assets that are not
often at issue in the supercharged IPOs.173 The proposed legislation
would have extended ordinary-income treatment to the sale of
partnership interests if the gain was attributable to a depreciable or
amortizable asset (such as goodwill, which is often in play in the
supercharged IPO), and if the parties executed a TRA in the context of
a supercharged IPO.174
The legislation would have effectively targeted the perceived
problem associated with supercharged IPOs and the TRAs that
accompany them, but it is unclear why legislators should worry about
tax arbitrage only in this narrow context. If the legislative approach is
restricted to deals with TRAs, it would change the tax treatment
associated with the tax benefits of amortization shared through a TRA
but would not address deals that accomplished exactly the same
outcome with a higher purchase price or an up-front lump-sum
payment, two alternatives to the TRA. Recall that the TRA is a means
by which Public Co. and its investors pay only for what they actually
obtain in the form of a future tax savings. The proposed reform would
essentially penalize selling partners only if they, rather than the
Martin, The Blackstone IPO: $4 Billion Payday for Private Equity Bosses, http://perma.cc/4RGM-
U9UT (wsws.org, archived Feb. 3, 2014).
170. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
171. The potential effects of the bill were widely discussed among lawyers and deal watchers.
See 'Blackstone Bill' Could Chill Buyout of Firm IP.O.'s, http://perma.ccl7DN-4YA3
(dealbook.nytimes.com, archived Feb. 3, 2014).
172. I.R.C. §§ 1, 1245 (2012); Dechert LLP, Proposed Legislation Could Affect Blackstone
IPO, 1 DECHERT ON PoINT, June 2007, at 1-2, available at http://perma.cc/Q9CE-CZCY.
173. For a detailed discussion of taxation of partnership shares and "hot assets," see
Partnership - Audit Technique Guide - Ch. 7 - Disposition of Partnership Interest,
http://perma.cc/H8FW-PHTU (irs.gov, archived Feb. 3, 2014) (discussing disposition of
partnership interests).




investors, assumed most of the risk that the expected tax benefits may
not be realized. The proposed reform, in short, is underinclusive.
It may be more fruitful for policymakers to reconsider the tax
treatment of the sale of a partnership interest more generally and not
only in the context of supercharged IPOs. This alternative approach
has recently been in the news in the context of the so-called
enterprise-value tax, which would tax the selling partners of
investment-services partnerships at ordinary-income rates.175 Such
tax treatment would represent an expansion of the hot-asset rules and
is, in the opinion of at least one author, fully justified.176 If the sale of
a partnership interest gave rise to ordinary income, the arbitrage
disappears altogether and in all contexts, and policymakers need not
concern themselves with whether or not the tax benefits of
amortization are shared.
C. Implications for the Literature on Financial Innovation
Finally, we turn to the implications of our study for the extant
literature on financial innovation. We find that our study builds upon
and extends the literature in important ways.
1. Mixed-Motive Innovation: Moving from Theory to Empirics
Scholars have long studied financial innovations and have put
forth strong theoretical arguments for why and when they come into
the marketplace.177 Scholars often set forth a range of views on a
single innovation, thereby suggesting that multiple motives are
present in the context of financial creativity. Some have argued that
mortgage derivatives, for example, were designed to better allocate
risk,178 while others have argued that they were designed to exploit
naive investors.79 Some argue that hybrid financial instruments
175. PRIVATE EQUITY GROWTH CAPITAL COUNCIL, BACKGROUND ON THE ENTERPRISE VALUE
TAX (2011), http://perma.cc/59AZ-4F3V (pegcc.org, archived Feb. 3, 2014); Matt Glans, Research
and Commentary: Enterprise Value Tax, http://perma.cc/XM2E-EDG6 (heartland.org, archived
Feb. 3, 2014); Peter Lattman, White House Rankles Wall Street with Enterprise Value Tax,
http://perma.ccl644H-87JM (dealbook.nytimes.com, archived Feb. 3, 2014).
176. See generally Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in Private
Equity Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2008) (arguing status quo is untenable and Congress should
consider adopting a new baseline rule that would treat carried interest distributions as ordinary
income).
177. See extensive discussion found in Part III, supra notes 75-125 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 99-101.
179. See GREG FARRELL, CRASH OF THE TITANS (2010) (exploring causes of the 2008 crash).
See generally RICHARD BOOKSTABER, A DEMON OF OUR OWN DESIGN (2007) (discussing how
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provide an efficient allocation of risk to bank investors,180 while others
argue that these innovations are designed to avoid the corporate tax
and manipulate bank regulatory requirements.181 Scholars interested
in financial innovation tend to offer a range of plausible competing
theories but rarely subject them to empirical testing.182
Our study contributes to this theoretical literature by providing
an empirical method for rooting out multiple drivers-or the key
driver-of a particular financial innovation. By investigating the
various theoretical explanations for the supercharged IPO and then
subjecting each of the theories to empirical testing, we were able to
locate the primary impetus for the supercharged IPO. And just as
importantly, we were able to eliminate theories that did not hold up
under our empirical investigation. Many scholars and commentators
have argued that supercharged IPOs are nothing more than a means
by which owner-founders steal from naive investors183-- our study does
not support this claim. Instead, our empirical findings show that the
financial innovation of the supercharged IPO was engineered to
reduce tax costs. It does so by taking advantage of a tax arbitrage
between the founders of firms organized as partnerships and selling
equity at a 15% tax rate, with Public Co. and its investors taking
amortization deductions at up to a 35% rate.184 Of course, this finding
does not eliminate the suspicion that supercharged IPOs are
nonetheless inherently unfair and problematic. Unlike innovations
that reduce nontax transaction costs, it is less clear that this tax-
driven financial innovation increases overall social welfare.185 While
one can hypothesize that TRAs reduce information costs by allocating
the value of tax assets to the parties in the best position to value the
information (the founders),186 our data suggest that parties actually
financial innovations are often opportunistic mechanisms to take advantage of information
asymmetries).
180. SVEN-ERIc BARSCH, TAXATION OF HYBRID FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS AND THE
REMUNERATION DERIVED THEREFROM IN AN INTERNATIONAL CROSS-BORDER CONTEXT 13, 15
(2012) (discussing innovation as a means to efficiently share risk).
181. Id. at 21-41.
182. See Abir & Chokri, supra note 28, at 17-18 ("[I]n spite of extensive descriptive literature
on financial innovation, there is a paucity of empirical studies."); Akhavein et al., supra note 28,
at 578 (discussing seven quantitative studies investigating the process by which innovation
diffuses); Lerner, supra note 28, at 224 (stating that despite the importance of financial
innovation, only thirty-nine empirical studies exist on the topic).
183. See supra notes 11-20 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 61-63, 82-91, 143-45, and accompanying text.
185. Many critics and legislators believe the innovation decreases social welfare. See
discussion of proposed legislative reforms supra note 102 and accompanying text.
186. Rosen & Furci, supra note 17, at 9.
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use TRAs in the IPO context only when the founders can also benefit
from a tax arbitrage.
The value of our study is this: it enables scholars and
policymakers to identify the true motive underlying an innovation of
interest, to reject empirically unsupported claims, and to shed light on
underlying reform issues that are hidden in the controversy but are
nonetheless important to policymakers. In short, we believe that it is
useful to know what drives financial innovation, and while our study
focuses on but one example of financial innovation, our methodology of
looking at the characteristics of firms that actually adopt new
innovations can help researchers distinguish between the various
types of financial innovation, both positive and negative.
2. Diffusion Through Professional Networks
Our findings suggest that diffusion of financial innovation
takes place much like other forms of innovation: through professional
networks. In the same way that tacit knowledge and know-how is
transferred across technology firms in Silicon Valley,187 knowledge of
financial innovation spreads through the New York tax bar,
private equity and asset management professionals, and elite
accountants. Spreading technical information related to complex
innovations, whether implicitly or explicitly, is substantially easier
and faster when individuals work in close proximity, share meals, and
attend the same conferences.
3. Inefficient Market Pricing of Tax Assets
Our study also suggests a larger puzzle: are IPO markets
inefficient at pricing tax assets? The mere existence of a TRA suggests
that something is amiss, as markets should adjust the price efficiently
whether the tax benefits are assigned to the buyer or the seller. It
seems that markets do not do this efficiently, but our data cannot
explain whether IPO investors are simply indifferent to tax and tax
assets (which many people say, but seems implausible), whether there
is some incomplete price adjustment to the presence of tax assets, or
whether accounting myopia over current earnings (which are
unaffected by a TRA) dominates.188 Our discussion of transaction costs
187. ALAN HYDE, WORKING IN SILICON VALLEY 27-91 (2003) (exploring sharing of
information and various spillovers associated with working in close proximity).
188. Robert Willens, How IPO Founders Keep Their Taxes Low, http://perma.cclK73B-BQQA
(cfo.com, archived Feb. 3, 2014) ("TRAs may be fully legal; however, the entire import of these
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and risk assessment, however, suggests that IPO markets do
efficiently price tax assets. First, as noted above, the share price in
traditional transactions must account for the value of tax assets, and
valuing the assets requires parties to make numerous assumptions
associated with a potential IRS audit, the company's future
profitability, future legal reform, and the use of other types of tax-
planning strategies in order to identify the true value of the tax asset
to Public Co.189 Negotiation and bargaining leads to delays and may
kill the deal altogether, and thus, a more rational approach is to
supercharge the IPO with a TRA, thereby eliminating these risks,
delays, and costs.190
VI. CONCLUSION
A new innovation on the IPO landscape has emerged in the last
two decades, allowing owner-founders to extract millions of dollars
from newly public companies. These IPOs-labeled supercharged
IPOs-have been subject o widespread debate and controversy.191 In
this Article, we have explored the supercharged IPO and explained
how and why this new deal structure differs from the more traditional
IPO and how it developed and spread over time. We then outlined the
various theories of innovation and noted that the extant theoretical
literature provides support for both legitimate and opportunistic uses
of the supercharged IPO. With the help of a large-N quantitative
study, we have found that owner-founders are employing
supercharged IPOs not for underhanded reasons, but primarily for
tax-planning purposes.
The future of the supercharged IPO is unclear. The deal
structure is most attractive for companies that operate as
partnerships or LLCs before going public, as these firms can take full
advantage of the tax-arbitrage opportunity when they go public. The
primary friction that keeps the supercharged IPO from becoming more
widespread, then, is a weak one that is fully within the parties'
control: the organization of the start-up company. While
venture capital-backed start-ups continue to prefer organizing as
corporations, not partnerships or LLCs, there is some evidence that
agreements in the price of an IPO might not be fully appreciated by all investors. To the extent
the TRAs are not taken into account by such shareholders, they may lead to market
inefficiencies.").
189. See supra notes 44-49, 106-07, and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 11-20 and accompanying text.
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LLCs are becoming more common.192 And to an even greater extent,
there is evidence that private equity targets are more frequently
reorganized as LLCs. We expect that if this shift toward pass-through
operating entities continues, the rise of the supercharged IPO
structure will continue as well. If that happens, the loss in tax
revenue may prompt Congress to act.
192. See generally J. William Callison, Venture Capital and Corporate Governance: Evolving
the Limited Liability Company to Finance the Entrepreneurial Business, 26 J. CORP. L. 97 (2001)
(arguing that LLCs combine the advantage of corporate risk protection with the advantages of
partnership control and rewards); Victor Fleischer, The Rational Exuberance of Structuring
Venture Capital Start-Ups, 57 TAX L. REV. 137 (2004) (arguing that dot-com companies left
money on the table by organizing startups as corporations instead of partnerships).
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VII. APPENDIX: SHARING THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF THE
SUPERCHARGED IPO
Commentators have divergent views on the question of
whether supercharged IPOs work to advantage all the parties in the
deal or are simply a means for owner-founders to sneak money away
from public investors and public companies.193 Our empirical findings
indicate that the founders are not taking advantage of naive public
investors but are using this complex and innovative deal structure to
produce benefits for all the parties involved (although to the detriment
of the public fisc). 194 We now investigate, with the help of a concrete
example, how these added benefits-the new tax assets-are divided
between the parties.
To illustrate the costs and benefits of supercharged IPOs, as
well as their allocation across parties, we assume many of the factors
discussed above. First, because the most valuable asset in many IPOs
is goodwill, we assume that Founders Co. has exactly one asset with a
fair market value of $10 million. We further assume that the asset is
self-created, so it does not generate tax deductions in Founders Co.'s
hands.195 Second, we assume that the parties can pursue either a
traditional IPO or a supercharged IPO. If the parties pursue the
traditional IPO, no tax costs or benefits arise, but if they pursue a
supercharged IPO, Founders Co. will be subject to tax costs, and
Public Co. will obtain tax benefits.196 Third, with regard to potential
tax benefits, we assume that Public Co. has profits subject to a 35% tax
rate and thus will be able to amortize the asset it receives from
Founders Co. ratably over fifteen years with a supercharged IPO.197
Fourth, with regard to tax costs, we assume that Founders Co. and its
owners will be subject either to a 15% or 35% tax rate, meaning they
will pay either fifteen or thirty-five cents on each dollar of declared
income.198 Finally, recall from above that if the owner-founders are
subject to a lower rate than that imposed on Public Co., tax-arbitrage
opportunities are present. These assumptions reflect real-world deals
and demonstrate the circumstances in which we can expect
supercharged IPOs to emerge.
193. See supra notes 11-20 and accompanying text.
194. This new value is created through the generation of new "tax assets." See supra notes
136-56 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 50-69 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 44, 50-69, and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
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If the parties pursue a supercharged IPO, Founders Co. will be
viewed as having sold the company to Public Co. for $10 million (the
value of the asset) and thus will pay an immediate up-front tax of $1.5
million (a 15% rate) or $3.5 million (a 35% rate). Public Co., in turn,
will get two assets in the deal: (1) goodwill and (2) the ability to
amortize goodwill. Because the goodwill has a fair market value of
$10 million, Public Co. will be able ratably amortize it over fifteen
years at a 35% rate, producing a tax savings of $3,049,750 (this
number and all the numbers in the Appendix are presented in present
value terms and account for the so-called stacking effect of the
payments).199
The supercharged IPO, of course, also involves a TRA,200
requiring Public Co. to transfer 85% of the tax savings obtained
through the amortization tax deductions, or $2,592,290 in present
value terms, back to the owner-founders. The founders, in turn, must
pay taxes on this amount at either a 15% or 35% tax rate.
Table Al presents the details. The rows in the table identify
each component of the deal, and the columns indicate the effects on
the parties given that the IPO is structured as either a traditional or
supercharged deal. In the first row, we consider the value of the tax
assets associated with the amortization tax deduction in the hands of
the owner-founders and the new Public Co. If the parties engage in a
traditional IPO, there are no new tax assets created or tax liabilities
generated-the goodwill is of no value to any party.
Now consider the value of the newly created tax asset in the
hands of the parties with a supercharged IPO. The first row of table
Al illustrates the value of the tax asset in the absence of a TRA. All of
the value-$3,049,750-resides with Public Co. (and indirectly with
the investors). But with a TRA requiring Public Co. to transfer 85% of
this tax benefit to the founders, the numbers change. Row 2 depicts
the effects of the TRA. The bulk of the tax asset's value now rests with
the owner-founders-$2,592,290 -and the remaining $457,460 belong
to Public Co. These numbers account for tax benefits, and the deal
looks very one-sided in favor of the owner-founders.
199. For purposes of calculating the present value numbers, we assumed a 5% interest rate.
We also assumed that every TRA payment made by the company would then add to the "cost of
the goodwill," thereby increasing the amortization deductions well beyond fifteen years. For a
discussion of this stacking effect, see Rosen & Furci, supra note 17, at 9.
200. See supra notes 50-69 and accompanying text.
2014]1 371
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:2:307
Table Al: The Costs and Benefits to Owner-Founders and




Nature of Costs and Benefits
Tax No Tax
Arbitrage Arbitrage
1. Value of Tax Assets w/o TRA
To Owner-Founders $0 $0 $0
To Public Co. 0 3,049,750 3,049,750
2. Value of Tax Assets w/ TRA
To Owner-Founders 0 2,592,290 2,592,290
To Public Co. 0 457,460 457,460
3. Tax Costs in Deal w/ TRA
To Owner-Founders 0 (1,888,840) (4,407,300)
To Public Co. 0 0 0
4. Net Value of Deal w/ TRA
To Owner-Founders 0 703,450 (1,815,010)
To Public Co. 0 457,460 457,460
5. Division of Surplus 61:39 Net Loss
(Owner-Founders: Public Co.)
* Supercharged IPOs with a tax-arbitrage opportunity entail a 15% tax rate on
owner-founders and a 35% tax rate on Public Co.; if all the parties are taxed at a
35% tax rate, the parties have no arbitrage opportunity.
So far the table reflects only the benefits to the parties. Now
consider the effects of the tax liabilities in the deal. The third row of
the table assumes that the founders must pay tax on any and all
payments received. Because the owner-founders will receive
$10 million up front for the goodwill along with $2,592,290 in TRA
payments over the course of years, they will pay substantial taxes. At
a 15% rate, they will pay $1,888,840, and at a 35% rate, they will pay
$4,407,300, as depicted in Row 3 of Table Al.
Putting the tax benefits and liabilities together in Row 4 of the
Table, we see that in a supercharged IPO, there is a net surplus if the
parties are subject to differential tax rates ($703,450 + $457,460) but a
net loss if both parties are subject to the same rate
(-$1,815,010 + $457,460). This result confirms our empirical finding
above suggesting that tax arbitrage is a strong motivator for using
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this financial innovation, and when arbitrage is not possible, the
parties are unlikely to pursue a supercharged IPO given the net losses
that they face.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Row 5 demonstrates
that, after all the benefits and burdens of the deal are accounted for,
the parties divide the net surplus in a manner that advantages the
owner-founders (61% of the surplus goes to the founders and 39% goes
to Public Co.). This division indicates that the supercharged IPO
advantages Public Co. and that it is thus rational to pursue such a
deal, even though these advantages are not as great as the benefits
that inure to the owner-founders. Our analyses also show, contrary to
the critiques of the supercharged IPO, that it is not the public
investors that stand to lose in these complicated deals-rather, it is
the federal fisc. Figures Al and A2 depict the details of the
supercharged IPO, highlighting the transfer of the goodwill along with
the net benefits to each party.
Figure Al: Founders Co. Pre-IPO
Figure A2: Founders Co. and Public Co. After Undertaking a
Supercharged IPO
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